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PREFACE
During the summer of 1963, under the direction of Dr. Stanley J.

Folmsbee, Professor of History at The University of Tennessee, I pre

pared a short paper on an early period of Cordell Hull's congressional

career.

This study was fascinating.

It appeared to me that many stu

dents who know a great deal about Hull's secretaryship under President
Roosevelt are unaware of his preparation for this high position.

Thus,

during the latter part of the summer after a trip to Hull's hometown,

Carthage, Tennessee, it was concluded that a thesis on the congressional

career of Cordell Hull would prove a valuable contribution to historic$!
research.

Of �nvaluable help in this project was the staff of The University

of Tennessee Library.

Miss Eleanor Goehring, research librarian at The

University of Tennessee, deserves special appreciation.

ance was the staff of Knoxville's Lawson McGhee Library.

Also of assist

I am also deeply indebted to those of the Department of History,,

University of Tennessee, who served so ably as members of the committee
responsible for the reviewing of this thesis.

Dr. LeRoy P. Graf and Dr. Ralph W. Haskins.

Of great assistance were

A special word of grati

tude is given Dr. Folmsbee, head of the committee.

And above all, my

faithful mother is thanked for her splendid help in typing.
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CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND, STATE POLITICS, ELECTION TO THE HOUSE
Cordell Hull, the middle child in a family of five sons, was born
in a rented log cabin on October 2, 1871, in Overton (now Pickett)
County, Tennessee, a distance of seventy-five miles from the nearest
railroad.

A mile away was the only store in the entire are a, and it

also housed the post office called Olympus.

The section in which he

was born w�s
known as the foothills of the Cumberland Plateau.
t '

During

the Civil War it was considered a b orde r area, and its inhabitants con
sisted largely of pe ople with divided loyalties between the North and
the South.

Hull's father chose to fight on the side of the Confederacy.1

As to the type of people who surrounded Hull during his e arly years-
they were a common group possessed with that quality of the frontier
"Jacksonian spirit" that was to characterize many of our nation's
leade rs of Hull's time.

They were unalterably convinced that in a

democratic nation an individual, by hard work and discipline, could rise
far above his lowly surroundings of birth.

Hull typified the "Jacksonian

spirit"--.the rise of the conunon man.
Cordell Hull's e arly schooling was received at various free
schools which he attended, as his father moved frequently within the
1cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (2 vols., New York:
The Macmillian Company-:--1'948), I, t:'6.
1

mountain section establishing new farms.

2
It was while going to school

at Willow Grove, a distance of two miles from the family farmhouse,

that the father made a decision which had lasting effect on the son's

life. During a school debate which attracted most of the community, the

fourteen-year-old Hull delighted his father.so much by his presentation

that the proud father readily decided that his middle son should receive
the best educ�tion possible.

The debate resulted in Hull's being sent to Montvale·lnstitute·in

Celina, the county seat of Clay County. The principal of the schQol was

Professor Joe S. McMillin, the brother of Congressman Benton McMillin of

Tennessee.

There, during the first months of 1886, Hull studied algebra,

geometry, trigonometry, surveying, English, rhetoric, Latin, Greek, and

German. He soon found that he was much more interested by "mathematics,
history, and literature than by languages and· sciences."

Before the

age of twelve, Hull had found that he "could answer any question in. the
United States history textbook" and even the footnotes. During the

same year, 1886, he went to the "normal school at Bowling Green, Kentucky,"
2
which he attended for two five-months terms.
The first large city that Hull ever saw was Nashville, Tennessee,

when at the age of sixteen he floated down the Cumberland River on a
raft.

I n his book, The Memoirs �.Cordell Hull, he records his vivid

impressions:

2 I bid. ,

14-18.

3

It was a sight to be treasured, one·r shall always recall. The
buildings were more magnificent and the people more numerous than
I could have imagined. Nashville was the metropolis of middle
Tennessee, most of which was a bluegrass section. It was a large
hardwood market as well as a market for livestock and farm com
modities generally. It was then, as now, a noted educational city,
sometimes called the Athens of the South. The·city was calculated
to impress, not to say overawe, the average young backwoodsman like
myself who first·visited it.3

There, in Nashville, Hull bought his first law books, paying for them
from the wages received from working on the raft.

Before Hull was quite seventeen years old, he made his first po

litical speech. It was during the presidential campaign of 1888 between

Cleveland and Harrison, with the major issue being the tariff question.
Hull supported Cleveland's platform for a lower tariff, and thus formu
lated ideas which would endure the remainder of his life and affect
people in all corners of the world.

That fall Hull traveled to Lebanon,

Ohio, and enrolled in the National Normal University, the parent school
of the normal school he attended at Bowling Green, Kentucky. There he

scored 90, 95, and 100 in debating, 95 in elocution,. 100 in rhetoric,

and 60 to 75 in other subjects.4

In 1890 Hull began to study law· in Nashville in.the office of

Pitts and Meeks. During the summer of the same year, he was selected

for an office which he later declared "thrilled me more than any other
since that time."

He was elected chairman-of the Democratic County

3 rbid., 19-21.

York:

4liarold B. Hinton, Cordell_Hull, ! Biography (Garden City, New
Doubleday, Doran, and Company, Inc. , 1942), 46.

4

Committee for Clay County.5 Although only nineteen,.the same summe� he
was chosen as a delegate to the Democratic State Convention. He·partici

pated in the convention even though.he was not able to vote·in elections.6

That fall Hull read law in the office of Congressman·Benton McMillin's
brother, John H. McMillin, in Celina. When the Congressman arrived to

campaign for his reelection, he found the ambitious young man more than

willing to offer his assistance. Driving a horse and buggy, Hull toQk

Congressman McMillin across the rugged Cumberland Plateau and Highland
Rim areas of his mountainous district.

From this experience, especially

through talking with Congressman McMillin, Hull gained a considerable

amount of practical political knowledge.

I n January, 1891, Hull began.his formal. law education by enter

ing Cumberland Law School at Lebanon, Tennessee. After successfully

passing a rigid entrance examination, he was promptly permitted to enter

the senior-class. I n June of the same year, he passed the final examina
tions, was graduated, and was sworn in as a memper of the bar.7

While practicing law during the summer of 1892, several weeks

before his twenty-first birthday, Hull campaigned to represent his

traditionally Democratic·county in the state legislature.8 To the sur�\
5Hull, op. cit., I , 2 1-26.

6Nashville Tennesseean, July 24, 1955.
7Hull, op. cit., I, 26-�7.

8Nashville_Tennesseean, July 24, 1955.

5

prise of many, he soqndly defeated his Democratic opponent in the

primary election, and upon tuF.ni-n.g·- t:�nty-one a month before the regular

November election, he won an easy victory over the Republican candidate.
Hull was reelected in 1894 without opposition, and became chair

man of the Joint Legislative Committee.

He immediately found himself

confronted with the election contest "then pending between Governor

Pete·r Turney and H. Clay Evans, the Republican candidate... 9

Evans had

received 105,104 votes, and Turney 104,356. 10 At that time the state

constitution and a state law required the payment of a poll tax by

voters, and Turney's supporters contended that many of those who voted

for Evans had not paid the tax, or that the Republican Party had paid
the tax for them. The legislature passed a resolution introduced by

Hull authorizing an investigation by a legislative committee.

That

committee, also headed by Hull, decided to divide into subcommittees

and canvass the areas where those-election irregularities had been-re

ported.

Hull t deliberately chose East Tennessee, the Republican strong

hold where most of the questionable·ballots lay. In counties such �s

Hawkins and Sevier, Hull and his group were warned not to enter for their
lives would be endangered.

Nevertheless, they went into all the East

Tennessee counties, and while they were in Sevier County, shots were
9Hull, £.2· _cit. , I, 27-31.
lOHinton, op. cit., 46.

6

·fired at the hotel in which they were staying.

After ttie committee had

made a meticulous investigation of the entire state, Hull presented the
majority report in the House, and after a heated debate, the Senate

concurred. 1 1 The state legislature declared that 94, 794 "legal" votes

had been cast for the Democrat, Governor Turney, and 92, 440 for Evans. 12

It should be mentioned that Eugene Lewis in his article describing

the election presents a more balanced point of view than either Hull or
his biographer, Harold B. Hinton.

In addition to setting·out the points

of evidence described by those writers, Lewis states that a minority

report was submitted and rejected which declared that "Turney's charges
of fraud rested alone upon alleged violation of poll tax law in the

non-production of statutory evidence." According to the·report,.the

"alleged violationf · was-· only technical and should not have affected the

qualifications of the voter. 13 Besides presenting numerous counter

charges for the Republican side, the minority report asse�ted that the
"election was as fair as any held in Tennessee for many yearsi.11 14
llHun·, �· cit., I, 31-33.
12Hinton, £.e· cit., 49-50.

13J. Eugene Lewis, "The Tennessee Gubernatorial Campaign and
Election of 1894, " Tennessee Historical Quarterly, XIII (March, 1954),
321.
14Tennessee Senate Journal, 1895, (April 30, 1895), 5 22.

7

In 1898 Hull's law career was interrupted by the Spanish-Amertcan

war. Hull quickly raised a group of volunteers known as Company H of
the Fourth Regiment, Tennessee Volunteer Infantry.

This company was

composed mostly of men from Clay and adjacent counties. 15 The Fou�th

Tennessee mobilized in Knoxville, and on November 28, 1898, Captain

Hull's men left for Savannah, Georgia, to sail for Cuba, too late, ·how-

.ever, to participate in the hostilities, as an armistice had been

arranged and peace negotiations were being held in Paris between the two
countries. The regiment landed in the province of Santa Clara and re-

.mained there on garrison duty for five months. The result was that there
was ample time for leisurely-recreational activities such as card play
ing. There Hull became most proficient at playing poker, and returned

home in May, 1899, with the reputation of being the best poker play in

the entire Army. 16

After reestablishing himself in Celina, Hull decided in 1901 to

broaden his law practice. He moved to Gainesboro, Jackson County, and

entered into partnership with John Gore, a prominent local Republican

who later became state senator and judge of the United States District

Court of Middle Tennessee. 17 Much of the success of the partnership was
15Hull, �· cit., I, 33-34.

1 6r bid�'' 36� • .. ·.. '
17 1 bid., 37-38.

11

8

attributable to the fact that the two were able to form a workable team

even though each partner strongly maintained and asserted his political

party identity. 18

The law partnership was of short duration due to the resignation

of the presiding judge of the Fifth·Judicial Circuit, W. T •. Smith. Judge

Smith� a close friend of Hull, had expressed his desire to Governor
James B. Frasier that Hull succeed him.

Hull, although.desiring not �o

relinquish.his private law practice, reluctantly accepted the appointment.

The judicial circuit encompassed ten counties in the Cumberlands, and

Hull traveled by horse and buggy over the mountainqus roads. The schedule

was arranged so that judge would hold court once every four months in each
county, and Hull found that a week's stay in each of the ·countie$ was of

sufficient duration.

Having filled the unexpired term of Judge Smith,

Hull was elected unanimously in the election of 1904.

During his judge

ship experience .he was to come in-close contact with those people who

were most responsible for supporting and electing him to Congress in

future years. 19

In 1906 many political friends and Democrats loyal to no specific

faction in the Fourth Congressional District 20 urged Hull to make the race
1¾inton, �· cit., 74.

19Hull, £f · cit., I, 38-4 2 .

20Tennessee's Fourth Congressional District included the follow
ing counties: Jackson, Macon, Putnam, Pickett, Rhea, Smith, Sumner,
Trousdale, Wilson, Clay, Overton, Cumberland, Fentress, and Morgan.
Official Congressional Directory��-�££ �_United States�
gress, 60 Cong., 1 sess., 120. Hereafter cited Official Congressional
Directory.

9

for Congress.

Seven years earlier the seat had been held for some

twenty years by Hull's friend, Benton McMillin, who had been elected

governor in 1898. Hull's opponents in the primary election were incumbent

Congressman M. G. Butler and James T. Miller. The young politician Hull
traveled extensively throughout the fourteen counties of the district,
making speeches and seeking voters' support.

In the primary election

he won by only fifteen votes. 2 1 In the November election Hull received

11,961 votes and soundly defeated J. E. Oliver, the Republican candidate,

who received 10,312·votes. 2 2

More than a year passed before the Congress to which Hull was

elected convened. During.the interval before going to Congress, he

established his residence in Carthage,. Tennessee, and then· journeyed to

Washington and secured the assistance of agricultural and public high

way officials who visited each·of the fourteen counties of his district.

The meetings were largely attended by farmers and were helpful in creat-
ing an interest within the area as to the need for improvement in agri

culture methods and the development of highways.

Hull also traveled to

Nashville and attended a meeting of those concerned with-the improvement

of the navigation of the Cumberland River.

I n 1907, still before attend

ing his first session of Congress, Hull took a boat trip from St. Louis
2 1Hull, £E· cit., I, 42�43. Hull received 6,298 votes, Miller
6,283, and Butler 3,103. I bid., 43.
2 2 afficial Congressional Directory, 60 Cong., 1 sess., 120.

down the Mississippi River to New · Orleans with President Theodore

Roosevelt and several members of Congress.

10

The purpose of the trip,

as sponsored and promoted by the Mississippi Valley organization, was

for the President and those members of Congress representing that area

to gain firsthand information about the Mississippi and its tributaries.

23

The Sixtieth Congress, to which Hull was elected, convened on

December 2, 1907.

24

Both houses of Congress were predominantly Republican,

and the White House was occupied by the dynamic Theodore Roosevelt.

At

this time a panic, the so-called Banker's Panic, was raging, with eight
thousand banks closed. 25 As usual, the first order·of business of the

House was the election of a speaker.

The Republican, Joseph G. Cannon

of I llinois, known better as "Uncle Joe, " largely due to his ironclad
2
. .
. position.
control of the House, was ree 1 ected to this

6

Soon Hull, as

anticipated, was to find that he had been placed by Speaker Cannon on two

relatively obscure committees--Reform in Civil Service and Pensions.

Following the undesirable appointments, Hull chose to devote little

time to the two committee assignments and to concentrate his efforts on

national issues.

The novice representative decided to specialize on the

23iiull, op. cit. , I , 43-44.

24'

Hinton, �- cit. , 108.
. , I, · 45.
2 5Hull; £E• ·cit.

2 6iiinton, op. cit. , 108.

11

tariff issue and to advocate the adoption of an income tax as the better

method of raising revenue.27

Thus Hull associated himself with the early

progressive·movement which has left a lasting refonn effect on the Ameri
can political scene.

27Hull, �· cit., I, 5 1-53.

CHAPTER II
AUTHOR OF INCOME TAX IAW
Cordell Hull.. ' s first two terms in Congress (December

2,

1907 -

March 4, 1911) were mainly concerned with the passage of an income tax
measure .

In addition, he unsuccessfully introduced other le gislation of

local interest, a sampling of which includes attempts to construct an
observatory for the Weather Bureau on Crab Orchard Mountain, to e rect
a public building at Dayton, and to improve the Obed River.

The bill

which he introduced to erect a public building at Cookeville, however,
did pass Congress and became law.1

On December 19, 1907, with less

than three weeks of congressional experie nce, Hull introduced before
Congress the bill2 which was later to give him the deserve d recognition
as author of our modern income tax law.

3

This bill, House Resolution

10548, called upon the Congre ss "to provide revenue for the Gove rnme nt
by levying an income tax . . .·" and was referred to the Republican-dominated

Committee on Ways and Means.4

Later in the same session of Congress, Hull

offered a House resolution directing the Ways and Me ans Committee "to
1Hinton, op. cit., 113, 122.
congressional Record, 60 Cong., 1 sess., 443. Hereafter cited
Cong. Rec.
2

3"Frontispiece,"

The World's Fair, XXVI (July,.1913) ,

4Cong. Rec., 60 Cong., 1 sess., 443
.
12

2 42 .

13

report bills reducing import duties and income-tax bflls .• " This, too,

was referred to a committee�

5

Legislatively, at the time of the introduction of an income tax,

it was considered a dead issue.6 This was in view of the fact that the
United States Supreme Court in the Pollock.decision of 189 5 had ruled

the income tax section of the Wilson-Gorman Tariff, passed by a_Demo

cratic Congress in 1894, as invalid. 7

Benton M�illin, Hull's Congress

man at that time, was largely responsible for its drafting and adoption. 8

The law was ruled unconstitutional "upon.the ground that a tax imposed

upon income derived from real estate or invested personalty was a direct
tax, and must therefore be levied by the rule of apportionment." 9

In

teresting is the fact that during. the Civil War, in 1862, a similar law

was enacted, which remained in effect until 18 72 without legal difficul-

t.1.es. 10

Later, in the next Congress, Hull called attention to the partisan

nature of the income tax issue, pointing.out that one of the "axioms"

listed in the Republican Party's "campaign textbook" in.1894 had declared:

"I n this country an income tax of any sort is odious, and will bring.odium

upon any party blind enough to impose it . . . . Prepare for the funeral of

the political party which imposes such a burden. 11 11

6Hull, £E_. cit.., I, 48.
51 bid. , I ndex, 481.
7John D. Hicks, George E. Mowry, and Robert E. Burke, The American
Nation (Fourth Edition, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1963), 197.
8 Hull,

£E·

cit., I, 49.

9cong. Rec., 63 Cong., 2 sess. , Appendix, 102.

10Paul M. Angle, Crossroads: 1913 (Chicago: . McNally and Co. ,
1963), 153.
11
Cong. Rec. , 61 Cong., 1 sess. , 4405.

14

In Hull's maiden congressional spee ch, March 18, 1908, he em
phasized the fairness and equity of an income tax and declared that
12
nine - te nths of the Democratic Party favored such a tax.
Speaking on
the floor of the House a year later, on March 29 , 19 09 , Hull turned his
attention to the tariff issue, and once again outline d the merits of a
comprehensive income tax.

As other observers had noted, he felt that

even though the Republican platform of 19 08 had promised a lower tariff,
the pending Payne Tariff Bill was more "upward than downward."

l

He de

clared that it was an attempt of a majority of the Ways and Means
Committee to continue the alliance "with the prote cted interests and the
trusts."

Hull asserted that "the footprints of every protected favorite

may be found around the items in which each is respectively interested."
There upon, Hull presented his pleas for the adoption of an income
tax as the most satisfactory method for raising revenue. In addition to
citing other authorities, he emphasized that Adam Smith had written that
"the Income Tax is the fairest, the most equitable system of taxation that
has yet been devised."

In attempting to offer the income tax as an

amendment to the Payne Tariff Bill, he pointe d out that the proposed
amendment, with the omission of those provisions found unconstitutional

in 1895, embraced the essential parts of the income tax law of 1894.13

Since the House was still under the control of Speaker Cannon, the lower·
14
body was not allowed to vote on the proposed amendment.
12 1

bid., 60 Cong., 1 sess., 3520.

13Ibid., 61 Cong., 1 sess., 532-534.

14Ibid., 4401.

15

Concerning the taxation of wealth, Hull stated, "I have no dis
position to tax wealth unnecessarily or unjustly, but I do believe the
wealth of the country should bear its just share of taxation."

He-fe lt

that the major burdens of government had long bee n "borne by those le ast
able to bear them," whereas, accumulate d wealth had for many years e n
joyed the fruits of protection, and thus avoided paying its fair share
of the government's financial burdens. He insisted that no state or the
federal government had passed a tax law which affected those of sub
stantial wealth.

The young Congressman voiced his belie f "that this

class of wealth would not and could not seriously object to the pay
ment of reasonable taxes in order to give some relief to the man of
moderate means. "
During the same speech, Hull also pre sented his attitude towards
the taxation of inheritances .

It was his contention that the right to

transmit property was not a "natural one," but was "more in the nature
of a privilege grante d the citizen by law. "

Since the citizen in the

process of accumulating wealth had been prote cted by ·the laws of his
state and the federal government, he felt it was only natural or practi
cal that the government should be compensated for its part.

This he

belie ved should be only in the form of a reasonable tax "upon the trans15
. .
mission
o f swol 1 e n and other fortunes. "
15 Ibid. , 533-535.

16
A division in the Republican Party, which finally culminated in
the battle between the Taft Republicans and the Roosevelt Progre ssives
in the

19 1 2

election, widene d as each day passed.16 The Progre ssives

supported the Democratic view towards a general lowering of the tariff,
and this, of course, was in direct contrast to the traditional Republi
can support of a high tariff. This was the group which had been able to
force the Republican Party in 1908 to adopt as part of its platform a
pledge to revise the tariff.

In addition, the new element of the Re- .

publican Party was an outgrowth of dissatisfaction with the limited
number who had exercised control of the government for some time.

The

progressive Republicans aimed their attack at the group known as the
"Old Guard Republicans," and primary targets we re Senator Nelson Aldrich,

Chairman of the Committee on Finance , and House Speake r Joseph Cannon. 1 7

Eventually, the Payne Bill passed the House with substantial down
ward re vision of the former Dingley Tariff.

Nevertheless, it was still

believed by the "Old Guard leaders" of the Senate that the previous high
rates could be restored.

Senator Aldrich's Committee on Finance quickly

introduce d a bill in the Senate with

8 47

amendments, the majority of

which were increases; yet Aldrich boldly asse rted that ''his bill would
reduce the Dingley tariff." 18
16

It was then that the progressive Republi-

Hull, op. cit., I, 59.

17Harry J. Carman and Harold C. Syrett, A History of the Ame rican
People (2 vols., New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1 958) ,11-:-372.

18Frank Freidel, America in the Twentieth Century (Ne w York:
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1 960), 87-88-. -

J

17

cans, led by Senator Robert M. LaFollette, carefully studied the ne w
tariff, produced tables, and concluded that the ne w tariff was about

1 .5

per cent higher. Throughout the nation, particularly in the Middle West,
indignation of the voters was aroused by the progressives' statistics.
Thus the progressives, having gained public support, took the offensive.
Taking advantage of public advocacy of tariff revision, Preside nt
Taft convinced the conservatives who had eliminate d the inheritance tax
as part of the Payne bill "that they must accept a compromise." Other
wise, they feared, the progressive Republicans would unite with the
Democrats to enact a comprehensive income tax law as a substitute for
the high tariff which heretofore had been relied upon for revenue pro
ducing purposes .

The compromise was a two per cent tax on corporate

incomes and the "submission to the states of an income-tax amendme nt to
the Constitution, " which when ratified during the "progressive upsurge
of

1911

and

19
191 2,"

became the Sixteenth Amendment on February 25,

19 13 .

20

Due to the cleavage within the Republican Party, Senator Aldrich
on June 28,

19 09 ,

introduced a Senate Joint Resolution as a.proposed amend

ment to the Constitution. The proposed amendment declared that "Congress shall have the power to le vy and collect taxes on incomes from
whatever source derived, without apportionme nt among the several states,
1 bid.

19

.!.2.!:.!,

20rhe Statutes1
,!! Large of the United States of America� March,
to March, � . , 17 85.

18

and without regard to any census or enumeration." On July 5, 1909, the
proposed amendment to the Constitution was unanimously passed by the

Senate.21

Four days later, Congressman Payne, Chairman of the House Way�
and Means Committee, introduced in the House the resolution of the
22
Senate proposing to amend the Constitution.
And on July 12, 1909,

Congressman Hull expressed before the House his views of the change of
attitude by the Republicans concerning the passage of an income tax.

Hull exclaimed:

During the past few weeks the unexpected spectacle of certain
so-called "old-line conservative" Republican leaders in Congress
suddenly reversing their attitude of a lifetime and seemingly es
pousing, though with ill-concealed reluctance, the proposed
income-tax amendment to the Constitution has been occasion of
universal surprise and wonder.23
Speaking further, Hull reviewed how he had introduced in the

Sixtieth Congress an income tax bill encompassing the main features of
the income tax law of 1894 with omissions of those provisions declared

invalid by the Supreme Court.

He pointed out that on the first day of

the present session of Congress he again introduced this same bill.

He

explained that there were two methods by which Congress might secure its

.taxing privilege .

One alternative was "an amendment to the Constitution,"

2 1Cong. Rec., 61 Cong , 1 sess. , 3900.
.
2 2 Ibid. , 4390.
231 bid. , 4401.

19
and the second "was a reversal by the Supreme Court of its former deci
sion."

I n reference to the two alternatives, Hull preferred "that Con

gress first pursue the latter alternative."

He continued to advocate

the inclusion of an income tax clause in the Payne-Aldrich Bill, hoping
that it would be upheld by the Supreme Court.
Hull, in the same speech, pointed out that the Payne Bill was
passed in the House without any income tax measure except for a section
imposing an inheritance tax.

During the debate on the Payne Bill, Hull

said that he "watched every opportunity, as did other members of the
minority, to offer an income-tax amendment, " but the iron-clad rules of
the House would not allow the amendment to be offered.
Hull continued in his speech to attack the " old-line Conservatives"
and described, as has been presented in this chapter, how the progressive
Republicans, backed by popular support, finally forced the conservative
Republicans to adopt an income tax amendment to the Constitution.

He

felt that the conservative Republicans reasoned that the proposed amend
ment to the Constitution would create a division among the supporters
of an income tax.

To create a division, Hull avowed, the Republicans

led by Aldrich in the Senate had presented both a corporation tax
amendment to the bill and an income tax amendment to the Constitution.

24

Hull felt that their idea was "to give an appearance of acquiescing in an
24I bid.

20

income tax and at the same time kill it by substituting" for the income

tax provision a like measure in the form of an amendment to the Consti

.
25
tut1.on.

They were\willing to submit the amendment to the Constitution to

the states, Hull asserted, because they believed there was little likeli

hood that three-fourths of the states would ratify it. Reasoning further,
he emphasized that two thousand amendments to the Constitution had been

introduced in Congress and only fifteen had been ratified by the states.

Also, Hull brought out that according to the census of 1890 it had been
statistically calculated that eleven states with 3.7 per cent of the
nation's population could defeat an amendment.

He indicated that since

thirty-five state legislatures would not convene until 1911 the present

"session of Congress should have enacted a comprehensive income-tax law
and secured the judgment of the Supreme Court at an earlier date, as

was done in 1895." He further contended that if the Supreme Court ruled

the act invalid, the "pending amendment" could be submitted to the states

without any additional delay.

In discussing the prospects of an income tax law to stand the

approval of the Supreme Court, Hull stated that the Pollock decision of
1895 "wou'fd not stand-up again. "

The Pollock case, which declared the

previous income tax law unconstitutional, was, according to Hull, "one

of the very rare instances in the Nation's judicial history in which it
25

Hull, £2· cit., I , 60.
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is universally agreed that our greatest judicial tribunal on e arth
erre d . "26

In concluding his speech of July 12 , 1909, Hull strongly as
serted that he would vote for the proposed amendment, and he hoped that
both Democrats and Republicans would aid in securing its ratification;
but he gave assurance that he would continue to maintain that the Pollock
decision was wrong, and that he would continue to pre ss for an income
tax law se parate from the propose d amendment to the Constitution .

While

attacking the Republicans, he said:
For it.has long been understood that the Republicans never
support a worthy cause until.forced by public sentiment . Too
stupid to devise and enact wholesome laws and to formulate and
execute sound administrative policie s, this piratic,, organiza
tion is wont to wait until Democrats point the way .
As the proposed constitutional amendment was being presented to
the states, Hull continue d to press for a direct income tax law.

Dur

ing the second session of the Sixty-first Congress, on January 27, 1910,
he presented reports on eighteen foreign countries' syste ms of taxation,
all of which include d income taxes. Hull again argue d that a compre
hensive income tax would be fairer to all than the " pre sent tariff
monopoly law."

Hull's other major points were that the rates could be

easily changed, the income tax.would be productive, wealth could not
e vade an income tax, and since the income tax would be based on the
26

I bid .

27 cong . Rec. , 61 Cong . , 1 sess . , 4401-4405 .
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ability to pay it could not be called socialistic.

He referred to the

fact that the greater portion of the nation's indirect taxation fell

upon incomes of two thousand dollars and less.

"this country is approaching a tax revolution.

Thus he concluded that

The defenders of privilege,

so long triumphant, can not turn back the tide of fiscal reform.

Their

opposition is a challenge to the civilization and representative govern
ment of our twentieth century. 1128

Finally, in 1913, during the Sixty-third Congress, Hull was able

to reap the fruits of his efforts for the adoption of a national income
tax. The amendment to the Constitution had been ratified by the

necessary states; a Democrat, Woodrow Wilson, was the new President; and
2
both Houses of Congress were Democratic. 9 Previously, during· the

Sixty-second Congress, Hull had been selected as a member of the Demo30
.
.
. House Ways and Means Committee.
. co��ttee,
cratic
As a mem ber of this

Hull, in 1913, became author of our first permanent income tax measure,
which was incorporated with minor changes from his original proposal
within the Underwood Tariff.31

Interesting in respect to our present-

day scales, the provisions of the new income tax law allowed an exemp281 bid , 2 sess., 1109-1115.
.

29Hicks, et al.,££· cit., 365.

30Edward G. Lowry, "The Tariff Reformers, " Harper's Weekl , LV
y
(Feb���ry 4, 1911), 8-9.

� . .� .

...

31Hinton, �· cit., 153.
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tion of $3,000 for single persons and an additional $1,000 exemption
for those married persons living together. The graduate d structure's
rates increased as follows:

1 per cent on income over $3,000 and less

than $20,000; 2 pe r cent on income over $20,000 and less than $50,000;
3 per cent on income ove r $75,000 and less than $100,000; 4 per cent on
income more than $100,000 and less than $250,000; 6 per cent on income
over $250,000 and less than $500,000; and all sums above $500,000 we re

taxed at 7 per ce nt.32 In the Senate Republican insurgents William E.
Borah, J. L. Bristow, and Robert M. LaFollette all pressed for stiffer
rates,

33

but Hull was supported by President Wilson.

The President, who

took a kee n interest in the bill, realized it would be unpopular, and thus
favored a bill that would be as unburdensome as possible to raise the

necessary revenue.34

During the framing of the income tax law, Hull received national
publicity.

The� York Times carried numerous articles describing Hull's

role as author of the income tax section of the Underwood Tariff.35

A

full-page picture of Hull was printe d on the frontispiece of the national
32
Cong.�·, 63 Cong. , 1 sess., Appendix, 358-359.
33Angle,

£E·

cit., 153.

34Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson Life and Letters (8 vols.,
Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and--aoiiipany, I nc., 1931),
IV, 111.

35New York Times Index, 1913.
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--

magazine, The World's Work. 36 Thr�e
. magazines--The American Review of

Reviews, 3 7 The Literary Digest, 38 and Harper's Weekly 39 --contained por

traits of Hull and articles commenting on the new income tax law and his
contributions. Thus Hull, heretofore an obscure Representative from a

little known area in Tennessee, become of national stature.

By all he

was held in high esteem for his well-grounded and thorough knowledge of

tax measures. Champ Clark, Speaker of the House, later recorded:

"In

one branch of our financial system-�income taxes--Judge Cordell Hull of

Tennessee is considered the fountain-head of information.

He is the

thorough master of that subject and is relied on implicitly as an authority
by both the House and the executive departments."40

In January, 1 9 14, Hull was afforded the opportunity of speaking

before the State Bar Association of New York.

In this address, which

typified many of his Congressional speeches, Hull once again outlined

the history of taxation, stressed that the new income tax law was based
36"Frontispiece, " loc. cit.

37 "The Progress of the World, " The· American Review of.Reviews,
XLVII (May, 1 9 1 3), 5 74.
38

"The Income Tax Under Fire, " The Literary Digest, XIL (May 24,
· 19 1 3), 116 3 .
39

1owry, loc. cit.,

9.

40champ Clark, � Quarter Century of American Politics (2 vols.,
New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 19 20), II, 343.

25
on the ability to pay, and that more than fifty countries and state s had
adopted this me thod of taxation and none had repealed the measure .

In

addition to a large portion of the speech devoted to various technical
features of the law, Hull strongly answere d in rebuttal concerning the
preponderance of adverse criticism from the e astern section of the country.
That area, upon the theory that it would unfairly contribute more taxe s
than any other section, strongly opposed the tax .

I n re ferring to N�w

York as an example of the eastern section, Hull described the importance
of Ne w York as the great center of commerce of the nation, and the n con
tributed to remind the state that its concentrated wealth was only made
possible by profits largely drawn from industries throughout the country.
He concluded by de nying "the right of wealth anywhere to segregate itself
and then upon the plea of segregation to exe mpt itself from its fair share
of taxes . "

41

Later that year Hull re ceived a heartening le tter ·from William G.
. McAdoo, Secretary of the Tre asury, who congratulated him on the re sults
of the income tax law for the fiscal year which had ended June 30, 1914.
Secretary McAdoo wrote:
I am sure that you are as much gratified as I am with the
showing. The law is new and, although unpopular in some quarters,
it is not one-tenth as unpopular as partisan papers re present it
and certainly not near so unpopular as the average men expected
41cong. Rec. , 63 Cong. , 2 sess., Appe ndix, 104-106.
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it to be . On the whole th� e is e very re ason to feel gratified
with its success thus far.

2

I llustrating the contention of many le ading nation-wide magazines
that the additional tax on increased incomes was discriminatory against
larger incomes, The American Re view of Reviews stated that a 1 per cent
income tax with an exemption of $1,000 v'would be more in accordance with
the American spirit and with American common sense . 11 43

Additional criti

cism of the income tax law was made by Representative William E . Humphrey
of Washington44 in an introduction to an article published in several
newspapers.

Hull, on January 2 0, 1915 , extending his remarks in the

Appendix of the Congressional Record, described the contents of Humphrey' s
introduction as "cheap, coarse, and abusive."

Contending that the income

tax law in our country had not created "one-fourth the criticism and con
troversy" that other countries had experience d upon its enactment, Hull
forcibly reminded the reader:
I t is not surprising that some highbound protectionists would
oppose an income tax or any other honest tax designed to compel
the we alth of the country to do what it has never done--bear its
fair share of taxes. Neithe r is it surprising that the large
owners of our we alth would, through any subservient newspaper or
other available source, seek to prejudice any law of this charac
ter, either by superficial criticism or by grossly misleading statements . 45
42
43

Hu11, op. cit. , I, 74 .
"The Progress of the World," loc . cit.

44

Cong . Rec. , 63 Cong ., 3 sess . , Appendix, 156, I ndex, 6.

45 Ibid.,

Appendix, 156-157.
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Finally, on January 24, 19 16, the Supreme Court in deciding the
case of Frank

g.

Brushaber , Appellant, versus Union Pacific Railroad

Company, affirmed the constitutionality of the income tax law .

The

following day Hull received unanimous consent from the House that the
above case be made a House document, and he was assured by his colleague,
Congressman J ames R. Mann of Illinois, that ample copies of the decision
would be printed by the Government Printing Office.46

In other legislation of the Wilsonian period, the President was
fortunate to have, in addition to Hull, a capable group of congressmen
to assist him in the carrying-out of his objectives.

Such men, all

close colleagues of Hull, were Carter Glass of Virginia, who later became Wilson's Secretary. of the Treasury, Henry T. Rainey of Illinois,

Claude Kitchin of North Carolina, and Henry D. Clayton.of Alabama . 47

Hull, as a part of this group, was helpful in his vote and support for
the enactment of the Federal Reserve Act of 19 13, the Clayton Anti-Trust

Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act of 19 14, 48 and the Child Labor

Act, the Federal Farm Loan Act, and the Federal Highway Act, all of 19 16 .

49

Concerning the hotly contested prohibition question, Hull maintained
that it should not be a national partisan issue, but believed it was a
matter that should be decided by the states separately.
46� . , 64 Cong . , 1 s ee s . , 1538, I ndex, 9 .
47 Baker, 2£ ·

48Hull,

£E ·

.£!! · ,

IV , 111 .

cit . , I , 7 2 - 7 3 .

49 cong . � · , 64 Cong . , 1 sea s . , 2 035 , 8017 , 1536 .

Representing a
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district which was overwhelmingly dry, he was not in a position to act
as he might have otherwise chosen .

Hull was by no means an advocate of

prohibition ; he merely cast his vote as an expression of his district's
determined position .

He never spoke publicly on the issue,50 and during

the state-wide effort for prohibition in Tennessee in 1908, he discreetly
remained outside the state .
him as being a
•

•

11

Nevertheless, the Anti-Saloon League listed

51
•
•
nomina 1 partisan
of its
cause . t l
•

Of importance would be a fuller account of Hull ' s views on woman
suffrage, which became the Nineteenth Amendment in 192 0.

The Congressional

Record includes no remarks other than his voting record on that subject.
On May 2 1, 1919, Hull voted against the resolution proposing what became
the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution extending suffrage to the
women. In the Senate, Tennessee's Kenneth McKellar voted for its passage,
whereas John Shields failed to vote.5 2

Both Hull, in his Memoirs, and Hinton, in his biography, briefly
mentioned the women's vote in connection with the Congressman ' s. bid for
reelection in 1920.

The two believed that the Republican women wer e

willing to make the effort to vote for their candidate, while th e Democratic
women were content with staying at home .

Hull was defeated .

53

Joseph W.

Brimm, a native of Carthage and a high school student at the time of the
election, related "that the women were not so much casting their vote
5 0Hull, � · cit . , I, 140 .

5 2cong .

51 ·
.
H inton, op. cit. , 180 .

!!.£ ·, 66 Cong. , 1 sess. , 635 .

5 3iiull, � · cit., I, 115; . Hinton, op . cit. , 167
.

for the Republican candidate as they were against Hul1. ••

54
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When elected

chainnan of the Democratic National Committee in 1921, Hull declared
"that he would seek above all to see that the Democratic women were
adequately represented.

55

The following year, when running for his

former seat in the House, Hull strongly encouraged Democratic women to
vote.

He won by a seven thousand majority, for which victory_ much
56
credit was due to the women in his district.

On the political front in his home state, Tennessee, Hull for

the most part avoided controversial matters.

Nevertheless, in March,

1915, he found himself in the middle of a bitter political fight with

Luke Lea, the state's senior senator.

Lea was highly intelligent, had

been elected to the Senate when barely over the constitutional age of

thirty, and owned an influential newspaper, the Nashville Tennesseean.

On the other hand, Lea had a desire to dominate as much political

activity as possible.

Hull saw evidences of Lea's influence and pressure

on state politics as well as on himself.

Therefore, he determined to

destroy Lea before the Senator was able to control completely future

57
.
Tennessee po l.itics.

Backed by Major James Stahlman of the Nashville Banner, another

very influential newspaper, Hull personally talked with members of the
54statement by Joseph W. Brimm, personal interview.
56
. · , 167
S SH.inton , £2 · .£:!
Hull, £E · cit. , I , 115.
57 I bid., 77-78.
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Democratic Executive Committee throughout the state in regard to Luke
Lea, but his efforts met with little success.

He then decided upon a

He knew that as each day passed, Senator Lea was making

new approach.

strides through "promises or patronage" towards gaining control of the

executive conunittee .

He reasoned that the sooner Lea was defeated for

the Senate, the quicker he would be destroyed.

Thus, Hull sought to

arrange the date for the primary election for Lea's seat one year earlier

than scheduled .

Finally, after delaying tactics by Lea's faction, the state

committee met and voted to move the primary date forward to 1915.

The

result was that young Congressman Kenneth McKellar gained Lea's seat in

the Senate.

Thereafter, Hull steered clear of Tennessee politics until

his successful Senate race in 1930 .

I n the meantime, Lea had re built

his political machine and once again was Hull's opponent�

58

In summary, like many of the younger and more liberal members of

the Democratic Party, Hull was tremendously attracted to Woodrow Wilson.

With firm dedication, he worked for the President's political, economic,
and social goals.

crat .

He became labeled--and proudly so- -a Wilsonian Demo

Having established himself as a leading.financial expert through

his familiarity with the tariff and income tax, he was prepared for
the fiscal challenges of World War I .

The nation's President and leaders

were to become grateful for this service.
58
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CHAPT ER I I I
WO RLD WAR I :

GUARDIAN OF THE TREAS URY

From the outbreak of World War · I in July, 1914, the maturing
Representative Cordell Hull, now forty- three years old and having served
three uninterrupted terms in Congress, was to find himself once again
confronted with the nation's fiscal problems and responsibilities .

Be

fore, during, and imme diately following the United States ' participa
tion in the world-wide conflict, Hull was to play a dominant role in the
determination of the country's financial responsibilitie s . . This period
covered the Sixty�third through the Sixty-fifth Congre sses, all of which
were Democratic .

From September 25, 1914, when Hull be fore the House

warned America of the gravity of the European conflict and its glaring
international repercussions,

1

through February 26, 19 19, when again be

fore the same body he declared that the American citizens could and
should exhibit their patriotism and appre ciation of the heroism of their
soldiers by the purchase of Victory Bonds, 2 the Representative was to

offer his assistance within four maj or areas of financial leadership.
Various war revenue bills calling for increased taxes, the financial
and commercial benefits of an improved Cumberland River, the securing
of the passage of the inheritance tax, and the five bond drives were all
given thorough and shrewd treatment by Hull .
1cong . Rec., 63 Cong., 2 sess., 15721-15722.
2I bid. , 65 Cong . , 3 sess , 4340
.
.
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Because of the existing war conditions , Hull , on September 25 ,

1914 , advocated the passage of an increased "emergency" income tax.3

He was most critical of the Repu�lican opposition to the bill , and

pointed out that when the Democrats had been in the minority during

the Spanish-American War , although they had suggested economy , they were

willing to cooperate with the opposing party in the best interests of the

nation ' s security .

I n his opening remarks , he declared:

Mr. Speaker , if playing politics in the face of a great crisis
were proof of patriotism , I could pronounce a eulogy_ upon the Re
publican side of the House that would place them in the category
of the truest band of patriots to be found upon this planet. Dur
ing my entire service here--in fact , during my entire life--1 have
never seen any assemblage of grown-up. men reduced to such serious
and desperate straits that they were willing to lay aside their
judgment , the facts , the reason , and the patriotism of the situa
tion and devote their efforts to the propagation of extreme , hide
bound , stand-pat partisanship. 4

During the same speech , Hull defended the recently enacted Under

wood Tariff , explaining that its failure to produce the necessary revenue

to operate the government was due to the chaotic international trade

conditions .

Hull indicated that by taking. the minimum of monthly cus

toms revenue loss since the war had started the United States Treasury

would suffer a deficit of more than sixty million dollars.

He violently

criticized the Republicans for not at least offering a . concrete alterna 

tive to the existing methods of taxation .

Realizing the disastrous

political implications embodied for hie opponents in support of such a

cause, he insisted that if they were really sincere in the ir criticisms
31 bid. , 63 Cong. , 2 sees., 16964.
41 bid. , 15721.
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of the Underwood law, they would make every effort t� repeal the law
with its income tax prov�sion and reenact the Payne-Aldrich Tariff.

In

his final remarks in advocating an additional tax, Hull stated his plea

in the form of a sununation of the world situation with a £inn attack

upon the opposing political party. He declared :

This is an extraordinary tax imposed for extraordinary pur
poses. While we are not actually at war, we are actually facing
war conditions as much or more, in some respects, than if we were
at war. Our international trade was never better than during the
Spanish-American War. But the only answer we get from gentle
men on the other side in their political extremities and in their
favorite pastime of undertaking to bunko the people again is that
we ought to be economical. My God ! A political organization
that raised the ordinary national expenses of the Government
from $460,000,000 in 1897 to $982,000,000 in 1913, more than
doubled; first a billion-dollar Congress, and, second, as rapidly
as they could get to it, a two-billion dollar Congress- -they turn
around and confront us with the impudent suggestion that we saould
be economical . �aughter and applause on the Democratic side J
They say that this Underwood law that is helpless to protect the
Treasu ry in times of peace and in times · of normal trade is amply
able, it has such great recuperative power in a time of war, that
it will bring in ample revenue to meet all w�.i; emergencies.
�aughter and applause on the Democratic side J 5
Actually, Hull pointed out in a later speech that the Underwood

tariff had been successful in peace time .

In the appendix of the Con

gressional Record, Hull inserted a reply to an editorial of the Washing
ton Herald, which had complained that the Underwood revenue law had not

produced the necessary revenue before the war commenced.

Hull argued

that when comparing. receipts under the·two laws of 1909 and 1913, one

would of necessity include with the Underwood tariff receipts the amount
5I bid., 157 22 .
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of revenue secured from the income tax levied for the purpose of "dis

placing a corresponding amount of the Payne tarif f law."

Hull concluded

that by adding the tarif f receipts and the income taxes together during

the nine months of peace the Underwood tariff had been in operation , the
two had secured an additional $ 1 6 , 000 , 000 over what the Payne· Tarif f and

the Payne corporation excise tax would have procured during the same
period of time.
•

•

6

Although as a "guardian of the treasury" Hull was interested in

reducing domestic expenditures because of disturbed world conditions and

eventually the participation of the United States in World War I , he

made one important exception to this point of view.

This was in regard

to his pet project as a congressman , the improvement of the navigation
of the upper Cumberland River for the special benefit of his constitu

ents. As early as 1886 Congress had approved the locking and damming

of the upper portion of the Cumberland River from Nashville to its head

waters of navigation at Burnside, Kentucky--a distance of 325 miles.

Thus, many of the locks and dams were to be constructed in counties
represented by Hull.

In February, 1906 , a board of engineers , follow

ing a hearing in Nashville , made a report recommending a modification of
the upper river project to the extent that many of the locks and dams

proposed previously between Carthage and Burnside were to be eliminated.

On the grounds of this report that many of the locks and dams were not

presently justified by the commerce involved , Congress adopted the report
61 bid. , Appendix , 1044-1045.

in the River and Harbor Act of March 2, 190 7 . 7
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On April 3, 1909 , Hull insisted that the upper Cumberland River

should be improved in the near future. He called attention to the great

amount of mineral and timber resources of this section of the Cumberland

Valley, which was inaccessible because of inadequate water transporta
tion. He also stressed that the commerce of the Cumberland River ex

tended to the most important parts of the Mississippi River and would be

measurably increased by the improvement of the upper Cumberland. More

over, the river was suitable for locking and damming due to its rock
bottom, steep banks, and uniform width, and building materials were

accessible nearby.8 Disagreeing with the engineers ' report, he con-

tinued:

The fact that since 188 3 this river a bove Nashville has been
recommended by all the engineers in charge as suitable for im
provement by locks and dams, and highly worthy, should be borne
in mind. The fact, also , that Congress concurred in this con
clusion in the river an d harbor act of 188 6 , and heartily adhered
to it until 190 6 , having made numerous appropriations in acc ord
ance therewith, should not be overlooked. None of this board
have seen this section of the river.9

During later sessions of Congress prior to World War I, Hull con

tinued to fight unsuccessfully for appropriations for the upper portion
of the Cumberland River project. On March 19 , 1912 , while describing

the Cumberland River as "a magnificient stream of nearly 500 miles of

navigable river, " he referred to the upper portion of the river as "com

prising 200 miles running through the greatest undeveloped forest and
7 1 b-fd., 61 Cong . , 1 sess., 941.
81 bid., 942 .
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mineral region south of Pittsburgh without railroads or other suitable
transportation facilities."

He believed that these 2 00 miles had pro

duced more commerce even in its unimproyed condition than many of the
rivers which had had millions of dollars expended upon them in the build
ing of locks and dams.

Yet, because of the report of the engineers in

1906, there was no improvement of the upper river to be contemplated,
"at least during their generation. "lO

On September 2 1, 1914, Senator Theodore E. Burton of Ohio, former
chairman of the House Rivers and Harbors Committee, opposed the Cumber
land River project.

Burton based his attack on the summary of engineer

reports on the p roject as of October 29, 1912, on the population census
of 1900, and on a personal visit to the area.

Burton indicated there

would be only a small amount of traffic on the river in comparison to its
cost for improvement, that it was already navigable for six months of the
ye�r, that a small population of 30,000 would not justify its improve

ment, and that the upper portions of the river "were rocky and steep.1 1 11
Both Tennessee Senators, John K . Shields and Luke Lea,. defended the
project. Senator Shields related that the Chief of Engineers knew that
there were over 300,000 people living in. the area and that commerce had
doubled since the last engineers' report.

Senator Lea, in a questipn

and answer type discussion with Burton, carefully led the Ohio Senator
101
bid . , 62 Cong. , 2 sess., 365 2 .

11
r bid. , 63 Cong . , 2 sess . , 15 450.
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into reluctantly admitting that possibly the population figures he used

were not vali' d .12

Senator Burton claimed that although in October, 1912 , the Board

of Enginee rs had again made a report against the project ; 1 j within only

fourteen months the report was changed due to the influence of many repre 
senta tives and senators. Attending the meeting held i n January, 191 4,
which according to Burton resulted in the board's favorable report, were
Senator John Shields and Congressmen Cordell Hull, Joseph Byrns, Kenneth
McKellar, and John Moon of Tennessee.

From Kentucky were Senator Ollie

James and Congressmen Alben Barkley, Harvey Helm, Swagar Sherley, Augustus
Stanley, and Caleb Powers.

Burton reveal ed that Hull opened the discus

sion and that his remarks were recorded in about the first three of the

'
report , s thirty
pages.14

In his speech on September 29, 1914, Hull declared that Senator
Burton sought to destroy a project without sufficient evide nce. He felt
that Burton seriously refle cted "upon the fairness and freedom from bias
of those gentlemen'' from the Department of Engineers. He claime d that
the truth regarding the· favorable re port which changed the board's mind
was that in a meeting in December, 1912 , it was found that there was
actually twice as much commerce on the river as had been supposed .

Hul l

stated that only three congressmen and two businessmen were present at
this meeting. At the same t ime he expressed his willingness in view of
12�. , 15452 -15453.

13A search was made for the Board of Eng ineers ' report, but
apparently it was not printed .
14Ibid.
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the pressing war conditions to forego his efforts on the project until
a future date. 15

During the following session of Congress, the project was again

omitted from . the river and harbor appropriation bill, due to the finan
cial conditions of the country. 1 6

propriations for the project.

Finally, Hull began to push for ap

On April 8, 191 6, he declared that the

project, despite the misunderstanding of many, was never completely

eliminated. He said the Department of Engineers, not having ample in
formation as to the amount of commerce, had only temporarily discon

tinued the undertaking. After having learned, in December, 1912, the
real facts concerning the amount of commerce on the river, the entire

Department of Engineers recommended the restoration of the original
plan . for the improvement.

In 1914 the report was in turn approved by

both the Rivers and Harbors Committee in the House and unanimously by

the Senate Commerce Committee, only to be set aside due to the war

- effort. 17

I n the early part of 1917, Hull urged upon Congress the necessity

of completing . the project apd recalled the following critical happening :
There is the greatest urgency. I remember that during last
fall there was . a coal famine throughout the lower Cumberland
River section, along the railroads even, when the people were
utterly unable to secure coal on account of freight congestion
all over the country. I f the river had been open to navigation
the people throughout the lower Cumberland and Tennessee and
Ohio and· Mississippi Valleys would have had the most ample
supply of coal at the lowest possible prices. 18
15 1 bid. , 15917.

1 7r bid , 64 Cong.,
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Finally, during the third and last session of the Sixty-fifth

Congress in July, 1919, after the war was over , Hull and other interested

Tennesseeans and Kentuckians were able to reap the rewards of their ye ars
of unrelenting efforts in behalf of the Cumberland River project .

Con

gressmen from both states were instrumental in securing the coveted

appropriations in the general Rivet and Harbor Bill, which was signed .

by President Wilson on March 2, 1919. The new law included provisions

calling for the expenditure of $4, 500, 000 "for the complete canaliza

tion of the upper Cumberland River from Burnside, Kentucky, to Nashville,

Tennessee, " and made an immediate sum of $340, 000 available for the pur
chase of the necessary lock and d�m sites. in the two states . 19

Hull, too, ably led in the securing of the passage of the �n

heritance tax. � The New York Times on May 22, 1916, reported that Hull,

who had written the income tax section of the Underwood Tariff was also
the committee expert on the inheritance tax section of the forthcoming
revenue bill.

The article related that Hull had spent several months

of preparation in examining the · inheritance tax laws of other nations. 20
On various occasions he was outspoken before Congress in pointing out
the practicality of the inheritance tax as a supplement to the income

tax .

Following extensive research, 2 1 on July 8, 1916, Hull, address

ing the House of Representatives, advocated the adoption of the estate

tax in the following manner:

l9� . , 65 Cong . , 3 sess . , Appendix 220.
2
.PNew York !.!!!!, May 22, 1916.

2 1 Huli,

2.2 · � . , I, 80.
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I found, Mr . Chairman, as has been suggested by some of the
ablest economical writers and students in. this country, that
the inheritance tax is absolutely - equitable and just. I found
that it is, possibly, the oldest tax law in existence . I t is
common to every country, old and young, large and small, through
out the world . It is the quickest and easiest tax collected that
can possibly be devised . Some countries, with half our wealth,
have been during peace and normal times realizing more than
$ 100, 000, 000 on this particular tax levy, and without complaint
from anybody . 22

Continuing in the same speech, Hull confessed that he along with

many others had . formerly favored reserving to the states the inheritance

tax as a source of currency.

Hull explained that his reason for change

was due to the federal government's urgent and probably future need of

"internal taxes for more than $ 500, 000, 000 of revenue. 11 23

It was Hull's

contention that the states, although through no fault of their own, had
been most inefficient in the collection of this source of revenue.

He

felt that the states were hampered by the lack of jurisdiction, double

taxation resulting from conflicting state laws, impediments in reaching

intangible and other personal property, and conflict as to the residence

of the decedent which frequently resulted in prolonged legal contro
versies.

He also pointed out that when one state increased its estate

rates, often the wealthy taxpayers would change their domicile to a state

having either lower rates or no rates at all.

In New York, according . to

Hull, $400, 000, 000 had been taken from the state within the first eight

months following the enactment of increased rates. Thus, "it is utterly
22cong. Rec . , 64 Cong. , 1 sess . , 10656.

231 bid. In Hull's Memoirs, he recorded that in early 1 9 1 5
$300, 000, 000 to $400 , 000, 000 could be secured by an inheritance tax.
Hull, op. cit. , 77.
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impossible, " Hull contended, "for the states to secure any sort of uni

fonnity with respect · to these handicaps. 11 24

Continuing his speech in support of an estate tax, Hull asserted

that there was a general demand among the citizens for a "substantial
tax on the transmission of property. "

He indicated that "in view of the

far greater revenue requirements of the Federal Government and the com

paratively small amount of taxes" secured by many states in seemingly

fruitless experimentation with the inheritance tax, the only recourse

was for the federal government to adopt the measure.

He crystallized

his point by presenting statistics showing that of the forty-two states
having an inheritance tax, most recent accounts established that only

$29, 000, 000 had been captured by the states, whereas England, with less

than half our wealth, had in the past few years annually procured over

$ 100, 000, 000 from an estate tax.25

In expressing a need for state and federal coordination, Hull

reasoned that eventual unifonnity of inheritance tax laws gained through
federal . taxation would allow the states to receive a greater amount than

presently received .

His plan was for the federal government to secure

$150, 000, 000 by the estate tax measure and reserve one-third of the yield

for the states. . This, Hull declared, while contemplating fonnally in

troducing the idea in the form of a bill at a later date, would nearly
24Cong . Rec. , 64 Cong., 1 sess ., 10 656-10 657 .

251 bid .

double the amount of revenue previously derived from state laws . 26
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In support of the pending_ estate tax bill, as introduced by Rep

resentative Claude Kitchin on July 1, 1916, Hull believed that the rat es

when considered as a supplement to state taxes on shares of estates would
be more equitable, just, and reasonable than past methods.

He felt

that the proposed estate tax would "harmonize with the present income

tax law in that the estate tax would come from those receiving unearned

income and not from those receiving earned income . "

He explained that

the proposed inheritance tax of $ 50, 000, 000 would be less than one�half

of one per cent of the present $ 12, 000, 000, 000 increase of national

wealth ; · thus, capital would never be touched. At the same time, Hull

continued to stress the feasibility of an inheritance tax of $ 150, 000, 000.

Substantiating this point, Hull again mentioned England's success with
�his method of taxation, and stated that a percentage of only one and

one-half per cent of the average $ 10, 000, 000, 000 annual increase of
national wealth for .the past eight years would be necessary for its

. 28
operation.

I n closing his speech, Hull expressed the thought that the pro

posed estate tax "is not within itself

a

comprehensive bill but is

primarily intended to aid in meeting the temporary and extraordinary

armament expenditures. " He indicated, too, that if the present trend

of the federal government's taking over many substantial expenditures

previously assumed by the states continued, it was of necessity that the
26I bid., 10 65 7 .

2 7 Ibid., 103 7 2.

28 Ibid

.
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· federal government adopt the estate tax .

Hull again stressed coopera

tion between the states and the federal government .

He asserted that

through the use of both an equitable income and inheritance tax by each

and with a well-balanced system of reciprocal coordination of tax records
by the two, the states could repeal their general property tax systems . 29
Opposition to the inheritance tax stemmed mostly from various

states wishing to safeguard their exclusiveness to this method of taxa
tion .

The states, too, found backing for their cause from the Republi

can Party .

New York and Rhode Island strongly opposed the tax.

New York

declared it regarded the estate tax as ''strictly and naturally a source

of state revenue, " could not financially sacrifice the $ 1 1, 000, 00 raised

annually from the inheritance tax, and that double taxation would result
from the enactment of a federal inheritance tax .

opposition on similar reasoning .

Rhode Island based her

One Republican, Representative Charles

F. Curry of California, indicated that forty-two states collected in

heritance taxes and that the federal government h�d no right to make use

of that source of revenue.

The estate tax bil l was, eventual i y passed by both Houses of Con

gress and signed by President Wilson on September 8, 1916 .

The new law,

our first federal estate tax , became known as the Estate Tax Act of

1916.30 Although the higher rates advocated by Hull were not applied ,

he inserted many of the provisions of inheritance tax and estate tax laws
29I bid.

30
� . , 14158 .
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from other countries into the successful bill . 31 Just as the income tax
rates of 1913 prove most interesting to today's reader, the same applies

to the estate rates of 1916.
follows :

Up to $50, 000
$50, 000 to $ 150, 000 .
$ 150 J OOO to $ 250, 000 �
$ 250, 000 to $450, 000.
$450, 000 to' $ 1, 000, 000.
$ 1, 000, 000 to $ 2, 000, 000 .
$2, 000, 000 to $3, 000, 000.
$3, 000, 000 to $4, 000, 000.
$4, 000, 000 to $5, 000, 000.
Over $5, 000, 000

The rates on the estates as graded were as
1 per cent
2 per cent
3 per cent
4 per cent
5 per cent
6 per cent
7 per cent
8 per cent
9 per cent
10 per cent . 32

.

It should be pointed out also that as the war progressed and United

States debts soared, the inheritance tax rates were successively · rai sed
to meet the added financial expenses.

The idealistic Democrat, Hull,

naturally supported the upward revision of the estate tax rates. 33

Hull, too, as previously described, following the outbreak of World

War · I , continued to advocate additional revenue by means of increased in
come taxes.

Time and again Hull assisted in the drafting of successive

revenue bills calling for greater taxes and offered his close scrutiny

as to the proposed bills' capabilities of producing the necessary revenue .

As in former sessions of the House, partisanship was characteristic of
Hull's speeches in which he ridiculed the Republican Party .
,•

The

addresses were marked too by that which is obviously experienced during
31Hull, £E · cit. , I, 80.
32 11The Rising Cost of Inheriting $ 10, 000, 000, " The Literary
Digest, LIV (February 17, 1917), 444.
33cong. Rec . , 65 Cong. , 2 sess. , Appendix, 64 1.
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every war--emotionalism and the theme that all should unite and "rally
to the colors . "

Speaking before the House, on December 16, 1916, Hull voiced his

approval and support of the continuance of the emergency revenue act
34
He exclaimed that the conditions re
passed during October of 1914 .

quiring the continuance of the existing emergency tax law were even more

apparent than they had been earlier . . Taking a jab at the Republican

Party for its reluctant support of the proposed tax measure, Hull re
marked:

We are confronted by a Republican minority which seems to be
disappointed, desperate, and mad . They seem to be mad because
their wonderful prophecies of dire calamity that would sweep
over this country under · a Democratic administration and a Demo
cratic tariff law have been blown to atoms and have proven false
in every particular. They appear to be desperate because under
this administration and under the present tariff law we did not
have a recurrence of those awful calamitous conditions that
visited this country under the panic of 1907 when the Dingley
high-protective tariff law was in operation. 3 5

In March, 1916, Newton D . Baker, Wilson ' s Secretary of War, asked

Congress for $8, 000, 000 to provide for the expenses of General Pershing's
troops on the Mexican border.

It was obvious that military expenditures

would continue to expand and that the treasury would encounter difficult

problems of financing.36 The New York Times, on March 24, 1916, recorded

Hull's reaction and his closeness to the administration :
341 bid . , 63 Cong., 2 sess . , 16964 .

351 bid . , 64 Cong . , 1 sess . , 34 1 .
.
36H1.nton,
op . cit . , 152 .
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Representative Hull of Tenne ssee, of the House Ways and Means
Committee, who has kept in close touch with both President Wilson
and Secre tary McAdoo in regard to revenue raising, said today
there nee d be no concern as to means of providing any ne cessary
funds. He explained there were sources open without furthe r
legislation--the 3 per cent Panama Canal bonds, long term , of
which $240,000,000 may yet be issued, and the $200,000,000 of 3
per ce nt certificates authorized under the Dingley tarif f law.
Mr. Hull also called attention to the fact that the Treasury
probably received this year the largest revenue in its history.37
On July

8,

1916, Hull once again directed toward the Republican

Party his attack for its vain attempts to de lay the eve ntual passage of
the proposed re venue bi11 3 8 for which he had worked so prodigiously .
He stated:
This bill embraces a number of most important tax provisions ,
and , in my j udgment , it is a matter of deep regre t that t he me mbe r
ship here has avoided their discussion, e xcept to a very pa�tial
extent, but insisted as a rule upon rehe arsing and re has hing. old .
campaign speeches. Of course I can understand and appreciate the
severe stress of politics, as it appears to so�e of my ultrastand
pat f riends in the House; but laboring under these conditions, it
does seem to me having several weeks ahead of us we could have de�
livered our campaign speeches later on and consumed the time
allotted to this de bate in an elaborate explanation and discussion
of the merits and demerits of these tax proposals f or the informa
tion and bene fit of our respective constituencies. 39
In the same spee ch Hull exhibited a fervent display of patriotism in answer to an addre s s by Repre s entative Frederick H . Gillett of

Massachusetts . 40 Gillett declared it was a partisan measure drafted

and supported by the Democratic Party . . He believed a majority of its
own party could secure its passage and that Republican votes were only
37
38

New York Times, March 24, 1916.

Cong. � . , 64 Cong., 1 sess., 1415 8 .

391 bid., 10651.

40
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a matter of record .

Gillett de clared that the purpose of a re venue bill

from a Republican viewpoint was protection.
not support the bill .

41

Thus, the Republicans should

Hull, on the other hand, contended that Con

gressman Gillett had "practically notified the House t t that he and others

would ·impede the preparedne ss l egislation not enacted unless the re were
tax provisions which would virtually guarantee the "former creatures of
special privilege" such as the United States Steel Trust and the Ame rican
Woolen Trust a sizeable profit . It was inconceivable to Hull that anyone
who had previously advocated this legislation, unless "bluffing or play
ing politics," would alter his position when the nation was reaching the
most important stage of the e nlargement of its Army and Navy and the

.
42
.
.
.
strengthening
of its
forti. fications.

In a spirit of high regard for the historical patriotism demon
strated by those of me ager incomes, Hull expressed his appreciation and
referred to the age-old conflict of what is considered an equitable ap
portionment of taxes . He exclaime d :
Mr. Chairman,. it is axiomatic that e very citizen owes ce rtain
duties to the Government under which he lives . He must pay taxes
for its mainte nance in time of peace and fight for its preserva
tion in time of war. It is a great tribute to our citizenship of
the past and prese nt that those who have not had the ability to
pay taxes have been ready and willing in time s of danger to the
nation to leave family and fireside and hazard both life and limb
on the battle field in defense of our free institutions . The
question of taxation is always serious and important. It has
been, and e ver will be, a subje ct of constant controversy. An
irrepre ssible conflict has bee n wage d for thousands of years
41 1bid ., 1 6 3 .
0 0

42

1bid ., 1 0 65 1 .
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between the strong and the weak, the former always striving to
heap the chief tax burdens upon the latter. The conflict still
continues.4 3

In the Appendix of the Congressional Record, May 22, 1917, nearly

a month following the United States declaration of war, Hull extended

his remarks concerning the successful enactment of another war revenue

bill which became law on October 1, 191 7. 44 The bill embodied an addi

tional $ 1, 800, 000 in revenue to come largely from an increased income
tax and inheritance tax .

While affirming his support of the bill, Hull

declared the Ways and Means Committee on which he served had justifiably

concluded that the greater portion of taxes should be gained through the
taxation of wealth, luxuries, and pleasures.

In evaluating the income

tax as a revenue-producing device, he emphasized that in comparison to

all other·methods of taxation the nation possesses, the income tax offers
by far the largest source of revenue. Hull believed that its flexibility

and great-revenue-yielding capacity had made it the backbone of any

nation's program of financing in time of war. The usually modest Hull

stated:

It is with some pride that I contemplate the fact that this
tax in which I have taken a keen personal interest during. my ten
years' incumbency here is now ready to bring to the Federal
Treasury a billion dollars annually, and more when necessary for
the prosecution of the war against Germany. 4 5
43
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Fol l owing the- enactment of the war ·revenue act on October 1, 19 17 ,
there quickl y arose a controversy as to whether or not the sal aries of
senators and representatives in Congress would be subject to the excess
profits tax. According to Hul l , the controversy was shifted by the press
of the country to a general accusation that Congressmen had been exempt
not from the excess-profits tax but from the income tax.

Thus, Hu l l

wished to counteract the sweeping charges by making it cl ear to the nation
that Congressmen ' s sal aries were not exempt from either form of tax.

He

reasoned that the Treasury "wou l d and shou l d ru le that the salaries of
Congressmen wou ld be taxed on the theory · they were not Federal official s
under the Constitution," and that they were not subject to the law of

.
.
.
.
. .
.
exemption carrie
' the excess-prof its provi sion.46 A J· oint reso1ud w ith in
tion embodying Hul l 's views was unanimousl y adopted by the House.47

I n the spring of 19 18 Congress, having been in . session almost con�
tinuousl y since the extra session in 1911, began to make definite pl ans
for earl y adjournment. Although the war was stil l going on,. the � York
Times carried an articl e on May 11, 19 18, stating that Chairman Cl aude
Kitchin . of the Ways and Means Conunittee and Senator Furnifol d M. Simmons
of the Senate Finance Committee both supported earl y adjournment and a
special session to be cal l ed in November.

I t was also fel t by most con

gressmen that no l egisl ation was pressing and that Congress shoul d take
a rest.
46I bid . , 2 sess . , 522.
47 I bid., 525.
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Hull felt differently ; he believed it would be a mistake to ad

journ with no revenue laws enacted to tax the great amount of war profits.

He felt that it would be too late in November for Congress to enact a

revenue law which would affect the war profits for 1918 without the op

position claiming retroactive legislation.

Although the Treasury sup

ported his views, discouraging to him was the fact that his arguments

had little impact on members of Congress .

Since it was the function of the House to initiate revenue legi• 

lation and Hull held membership on the committee with this responsibility,

he felt justified in opposing the leaders of the House and Senate who
favored early adjournment .

In those circumstances, Hull prepared a

thorough analysis of the entire financial situation and sent it on May
15 to President Wilson .

Throughout the war, Hull sent Wilson important

memorandums direct, and the "President always replied in person. "

In

the letter, Hull strongly contended that Congress should not adjourn

early but should remain and enact inmediate laws to impose greater taxes-

particularly on the war profits .

The following days, rumors circulated from the White House as to

the contents of Hull's letter .

Newspaper reporters quizzed Hull , who re

mained quiet , wishing not to add to the controversy with leaders in the

House and Senate . 48 A day later, the New York Times, although disclosing

the major contents of Hull's letter, reported that within a week the
48Hull,

� - cit . , I, 95-96.
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letter would be made public .

It revealed that Hull supported Secretary

of Treasury McAdoo ' s views that Congress should stay in session and pass

additional revenue measures. The newspaper indicated that many high

sources in Washington believed Wilson was the instigator of the letter
in an effort to persuade Congress not to adjourn .

The paper, too, re

ported that Representative Kitchin was "not affected" by the letter, and
maintained that additional revenue was unnecessary until the following
year .

Kitchin felt that a more adequate bill could be written after the

49
.
'
of future expend itures.
government ha d a c 1 ose view

It is difficult to ascertain how much influence Hull's letter had

on the President.

Nevertheless, President Wilson, on May 28, made a

personal appearance before Congress.

He urged Congress to remain in

session and enact legislation to reach the war profits .

Later it was

Hull ' s belief that had Congress adjourned and waited until November fol
lowing the Armistice , it would have been practically impossible to have
increased the wartime rates.50

On September 10, 1918, Hull, in a passionate support of the pas

s age of the final war revenue bill, symbolic of the war fervor, declared :

Mr. Chairman, Congress is now confronted with the solemn duty
and the unusual responsibility of considering a measure which
would levy a larger amount of taxes than has ever been imposed
in the history of any nation. This tremendous undertaking on the
part of the American people has been made necessary by the war
for the suppression of rampant German militarism. The people of
the United States, acting as a unit, are capable of doing big
things, of meeting big responsibilities, and they will patriotically
and unflinchingly shoulder this war-tax burden--one that no other
49� York Times, May 17, 1918 .
S OHull, op. cit., I, 97.

52

country, past or pre sent, could undertake . Next to fighting in
the front lines, there is no better test of patriotism than the
willingness of the citizen cheerfully to pay the maximum amount
of taxes for the support of the Government in its prosecution
of the war . On the other hand, the lack, or the degrees, of
patriotism can no more quickly be· detected than in the pe rson
who complains of, or resents, the payment of his fair share of
an imperatively high war- tax levy . Especially since the st upendous
plans and purposes of the German autocracy to dominate first
Europe and Asia, and then the We stern Hemisphere, industrially,
financially, comme rcially, socially, and politically, have so fully ·
and clearly unfolded themselves, no intelligent pe rson with a spark
of patriotism or with the slightest love of liber ty will hesitate
to place both life and prope rty at the dis:e,osal of his Government
in this time of supreme crisis. [Applause � Even the casual reade r
now knows that from the day of the Potsdam Conference on July 5,
1914, world conquest and world domination were deliberately decreed
by the ruling powers in Germany, and have since been most vigorously
prosecuted by the German and its allied armie s . The most ignorant
person is now familiar with the uncivilized savage and barbarous
methods employed by the Ge rman Governme nt in waging this unholy,
outrageous, and unspeakable war of conquest . For brutality and in
humanity, for duplicity and false pretense, for rape and robbery,
for piracy and fiendish cruelty, for the malicious destr uction of
innocent lives and property, for the deliberate violation of the
inalienable rights of both nations and individuals, for the utter
and contemptuous disregard of eve ry vestige of right, j ustice,
honor, fair dealing, and moral sense, the conduct of the Ge rman
overlords from the day they plotted and precipitated this war has
been without parallel and without comparison, and has brought upon
their heads a universal judgment of 'Fiminal infamy which a million
years · of atonement can not remove. LApplause
Talk about "peace
by negotiation ! " How can you negotiate any q uestion with scoundrels
and villains, with assassins and freebooters, with highwaymen and
desperadoes? The y must first either be kille d or disarme d, and the n
let honorable men speak and act for their nation at the peace table .51

J

During the same speech in connection with the war revenue bill, Hull
outline d his thoughts conce rning the coming postwar pe riod. He referred

to the fact that over a ye ar before, on April 23, 19 17 ,52 he had intro
duced a resolution before Congre ss cal l ing for "the organization of an
51�. , 10160- 10161.

52
1 b1.' d . , 1 sess . , 9 9 1 .
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international trade agreement congress. " 53

Its purpose would " be to

eliminate by mutual agreement all possible methods of retaliation and

discrimination in international trade. "
are but the germs of real wars . "

Hull declared , " Economic wars

Therefore , by the removal of the causes

of war , he believed an international trade congress dedicated to the

above purpose would measurably reduce the possibilities of economic war

fare and greatly assist in the esta�lishment of healthier trade relations

throughout the world. 54

Interestingly , that same proposal made by Hull

became point three of President Wilson ' s fourteen points for a lasting

peace. 55

Beginning in 1916 Hull closely observed the thinking of organiza

tions such as William Howard Taft's League to Enforce Peace , and of men

such as Theodore Roosevelt and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge , who were all
urging the formation of an association of nations after the war.
strongly believed in the idea. 56

Hull

53I bid. , 2 sess. , 10 163. In February , 1916 , Hull made an extensive
investigation of the various acts , methods , and policies practiced by
many nations in their efforts for international trade �nd commercial ad
vantages. Hull was convinced that many of the efforts were "illegitimate ,
unfair , and unequal in their effects on other nations . " The result was
a great amount of "friction , ill feeling , and bitter economic strife ! "
between. the nations. At that time Hull prepared the above resolution
calling for an international trade agreement congress to be held in Wash
ington in which all nations should be participants. "After some con
ference , " Hull delayed the formal introduction of the resolution until
April 23 , 1917, when he offered it in "modified form . " I bid . , 3 sees . ,
3955 .
541 bid ,

2 sess. , 10163.

5 5 1 bid., 3 sess. l 3955.
56

Hu l l , � ·

ill · ,

I , 86.

54
Although he supported Wilson ' s plan for a league of nations , Hull
believed that point three of the fourteen points was equally important.
On February 21, 1919, he declared that the establishment of economic
world pe ace was most needed and would not conflict with any plans for a
le ague ·of nations, but on the other hand, "would supplement, strengthen,
and make e asier its operation," since there would be less commercial and
trade disagreements for arbitration.

Hull exclaimed that "commercial

power means political power, and as a rule, military power as well , " H�
pointed out that history has revealed that most wars of recent times had
arisen largely from "irritation, bitterness, jealousy, and strife" due

. d.1.' fferences. 57
to economic

Continuing in the same speech, Hull held that if all nations en
gaged in commerce would agree to the principles of the most-favored nation
clause 58 in its entirety, virtually all discriminations would be removed.

He believed that the colonial preference systems in which the mother
country gives "preferences to the colonial products in her markets and
vice versa" were in violation of the most-favored-nation principle.
''Mother countries and not their colonies, " Hull contended, received the
most benefit from the preference system.

Although he felt that the

preferential tre atment should be abandoned in the "case of autonomous
57 Cong.�·, 65 Cong. , 3 sess., 3956.

58The most favored nation clause as practiced in Europe required
"each nation to accord to the other as the party of the se cond part
treatment which is or shall be accorded in a like matter to that nation
most favored by it in another treaty." The United States at that time
had failed to adopt the doctrine in its unconditional form and thus was
not bound by the provisions, except with some limitations. Ibid . , 3957 .

or self-governing colonies, " he asserted the system should be allowed
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in the situation of "backward, uncivilized, or more or less dependent

colonies" in which the mother country had made their interest dominant . 59
During Worl War I Cordell Hull played a significant part in the

raising of nearly $21, 500, 000, 000 by the floating of five bond issues.

60

On April 17, 1917, he inserted into the appendix of the Congressional

Record his views concerning the first bond issue aggregating $ 7, 000, 000, 000 ,

.of which $3, 000, 000, 000 was loaned to the allied nations opposed to··· Germany ,
He stated that what the Allies needed most of all was credit.

He strongly

held that "the most powerful blow the United States can strike at this
early stage" was the procurement of credit to enable the allied armies

to be supplied with the necessary food, materials, and equipment.

This

would allow the Allies to carry on the proper amount of warfare against

the enemy .

61 The bill was passed unanimously by the House. 62

Within the same remarks, Hull included a discussion of the form

of fiscal policies the government should adopt during the length of the
591 bid . , 3957-3958 . The United States accepted the doctrine in a
conditionalform, which was that "the application of equality of treatment
is conditioned upon the receipt from the other party to a treaty of a
favor or a concession equivalent to that which was paid by the third
nation to which the United States has accorded the favor or concession in
question . " The United States in 1922, however, adopted the unconditional
interpretation, omitting the necessity for such a concession equivalent.
Wallace Mitchell McClure, ! � American Commercial Policy (Vol , CXIV of
Studies � History, Economics and Public � ' New York : Columbia Univer
sity, 1924), 148 and 169.
60Hicks,

!!

!_!. , op. cit., 409.

61Cong. � · , 65 Cong . , 1 sess., Appendix, 81 .
62 I bid . , · 690 .
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war .

He realized there would be "conflict of views" as to the most use-

ful method of taxation .

He explained that the nation should be most

careful in its approach since the ultimate method used would cause both
immediate and long-term effects upon the nation' s economy .

Hull indi

cated that there was "no fixed rule" as to what portion of war expendi
tures should be met by taxes or by bonds, but depended upon such factors

as the nation's credit and the estimated cost and duration of the war . 63
He expanded these views as follows :
I repeat that in financing a great war no fixed rule as to the
relative proportion of taxes and bonds is possible . The best
policy is to levy the largest amount of taxes that can be imposed
without actual and serious impairment or disruption of the normal
business of the taxpayers, making increases in such tax levies as
the war progresses and expenditures swell, and as business adjusts
itself to the new condit ions which such tax levies create . The re
mainder of the expenses should be met by the issuance of bonds . 64

Continuing his remarks, Hull pointed out that the bonds made avail
able to furnish loans to Allies should mature at a time when the Alli es
would be capable of making the payments . 65

As to bond issues for domestic

war purposes, he asserted that a different rule should apply .

He felt

that the best policy would be to eliminate bonded indebtedness as quickly
63 r bid . , Appendix, 81-82
.
64r bid . , Appendix, 563 .
65

r bid . On September S, 1917, Hull was instrumental in defeating
an amendmeiit"proposed by Representative Charles H . Sloan of Nebraska ask
ing for a thirty-year limit on additional bonds thereafter issued to
allied governments . Hull injected the view that the United States should
not adopt an "ironclad statute" but should . consider some of " their con
ditions and their wishes in regard to terms of maturity . " He felt the
allied governments would be overburdened by their own domestic indebted
ness without taking. into account foreign indebtedness . I bid., 6640-665 0.
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as possible without the tax le vies be ing "unduly burdensome or oppres
sive . " Hull belie ved that most of the bonds issued for domestic purposes
should be made optional or redee mable within approxi mate ly a five-ye ar
period. He reasoned that following the completion of the war a fixed
rate of interest could then be applie d to the total aggregate debt.

66

Cordell Hull, too, e xpressed a dislike of the sinking-fund method,
even though the law would carry very definite provisions as to payme nt
in the future. He affirmed that often the sinking-fund method, due to
its partial setti�g aside of money, resulted in detainment or defe rment
of indebtedness. He also contended that as a part of the se rial bond
plan, it would be feasible to increase the estate tax rates so as to pro
duce $2 00,000,000 which would be equi valent to one se rial bond payment .

This view Hull had expressed in previous sessions of Congress.67

I n addition, Hull emphasize d that he did not favor the establish�
ment of tax e xemptio�s for the bonds .

Taking account of the great amount

of federal, state, county, and municipality bonded indebtedness and the
property belonging to charitable and other institutions exe mpt from taxa
tion, he decl are d :
I have for some time been of opinion that i n amassing the
great war debt which the Gove rnment is be ing compelied to incur ,
the right of the Gove rnme nt to tax the interest on this debt ,
either now or following the war , should not be surrendered . At
the best , the amount of the world ' s capital which will be found
to be exempt from taxation at the close of the war wil l be appal
l ing . With the right to tax reserved , the cause of a bonded
aris tocracy can be avoided and the interest advantages accruing
to the bondhol ders · can always be kept on a l eve l j ustl y propor
tionate to interest advantages derived from other sources . Few
66 1 bid . , Appendix , 563 .
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greater e vils could arise than the entire tax exemption of our
public debt growing out of the war , especially if a period of
depression and hard times should follow the reconstruction
period , which would represent a situation in which would be
found one class of idle and wealthy bondholders owing no finan
cial obligations to the Federal , State , or local governments ,
and another class composed of the masses subje ct in their priva
tions to the enormous taxes to pay both the interest and the
principal of such bonds and other expenses of the Governme nt .
Such condition would greatly conduce to socialism . 68
Hull stated that if the pending_ revenue bill were passe d , the
third liberty loan , although the interest would be f ree f rom state and
local taxes , it would be subject to the ide ntical supe r income , estate ,
and excess-profits taxes as were levied on the second liberty loan .

He

opposed the tax- free bond policy , pointing out it had caused e conomic
distress in those countries such as Italy , Canada , France , and New Zea
land , which had used it. The offer of the third liberty loan at four
and one-half per cent interest , he declared , " pre s e nts to the people the
best , soundest , and most desirable investment to be found in the world
today . " 6 9

Before the House on February 2 6 , 1919 , Hull wholeheartedly sup
ported the final bond issue , the proposed victory loan bill.

In a mome nt

of pride characteristic of the nation ' s spirit of that time , and remind•
. ing the nation's citizens of their financial obligations , Hull de clare d :
Turning again to our own f inancial and economic situation , we
experience a feeling of great relie f af ter dwelling on the dark
picture presented by the other belligerent countries. Our popu
lation. is more than 100 , 000 , 000 and our wealth more than
$250 , 000 , 000 , 000 , while our annual savings must be more than
681 bid . , 5 6 6 .
69
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$ 15, 000, 000, 000. The Nation can without difficulty meet and ·pay
off its obligations far in advance of other nations. The Nation
can and should maintain and strengthen its unparalleled position
of world supremacy industrially, financially, and commercially.
The United States has to its credit a 19 months' war record which
is the admiration of the world, as it is the despair of the enemy.
Let us keep in mind at least some of the big things the Nation has
accomplished, some of the big achievements with which it has
startled the world. The courage and patriotism of our soldiers
and sailors have brought lasting honor and glory to the Nation .
Let us without brooding over little things, cheerfully practice
enough financial heroism to pay the necessary taxes involved. 70

Hull emerged from World War I as a recognized leader who had con

tributed a great deal to his nation..' s war efforts. His demonstration of
expert financial leadership proved him to be of considerable value to
the Wilson administration.

However, with regard to his own career, the

most important single result was his conviction that ''economic wars were
but the germs of real wars. "

Hull determined to offer more assistance

to the nation in arriving at a solution to the tariff question. On

November 11, 19 18, Armistice Day, President Wilson wrote F.

Chairman of the Tariff Commission:

w.

Taus sig,

The Hon . Cordell Hull, of Tennessee, a very serious student
of public affairs and a very admirable man whom I am glad to
call my friend, intends, I know, to seek an intervie� with you
about tariff legislation, and I am taking the liberty of writing
you this line to tell you he is worthwhile. 7 1

Having gained status as a ranking Democrat member of the House Ways

and Means Committee, and the war having been won, prospects for the future
could only seem bright indeed.

The disheartening result to Hull and other

Democrats was that the Wilson administration suffered a disastrous political
70 b1.·d . , 3 s e a s . , 4340
.!_
71

Baker, ££ · cit. , VI I I, 590.
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defeat.

I n the mid-tenn elections of 1918 , the Republicans captured

control of both houses of Congress.

CHAPTER I V
DEMOCRATIC DISSENTER IN REPUBLICAN OJNGRESSES
The election of the Sixty- sixth Congres s , which began on May 19,

1919, with both houses predominantly Republican , was the fir st of six
consecutive Republican Congresses.

In this Congress Hull served for two

years, which was during the remaining duration of the Wilson Administra

tion .

Suffering his only political defeat at the polls in a bid for a

seat in the s ucceeding Congres s , he nevertheles s served his party ably

as chairman of the Democratic National Committee. After being reelected

to the Sixty-eighth Congress, he served continuously through the Seventy

first Congres s, when he was elected to the United States Senate for a
six-year term beginning March 4, 1931.

It can be well said that the years between 1919 and 1931, for the .

most part, were largely uneventful year s for the Democratic Party. Hull,

along with other Democrats , for twelve year s suffered the cons equences

of a Repu blican-dominated executive as well as legislative branch of the

government. Although Hull--the di s senter--continued to voice his opinion
concerning the vital is sues of the day, his voice was seldom noticed.

The years marked those in which Hull expres sed his ideas concerning issues

involving post-war problems and assumed more respons i bility and leadership

as a member of the Democratic Party .

He also increased and voiced his

knowledge of the financial operations of the government , and ass erted
61
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his definite beliefs concerning the prevailing tariff issue which finally
culminated in his election to the Senate.

Other leaders of the same party as Hull's who served during that

"slumbering period" for the Democrats were Tom Connally, John Garner,

and Sam Rayburn o f Texas ; ·Alben Barkley of Kentucky ; Henry Rainey of
I llinois ; and Joseph Byrns and Finis Garrett of Tennessee.

Tom Connally

recorded in his autobiography that Hull "didn't fraternize much with other

members . " Connally continued:

He was a man who rarely made a speech . He stayed in his office
a great deal of the time doing research and gathering data and
statistics, and we looked upon him as a student. He wrote many
speeches on the subject of low tariffs, but he put them into the
Reco rd without delivering them on the floor . He wasn't especially
shy ; he just wanted to avoid rough and tumble debates . l

Hull, focusing the attention of the House on less serious matters

of the day, on May 24, 1919, proudly informe� the body of the presence of
Sergeant Alvin C. Yo rk. 2

Sergeant York, who was awarded the United

States Medal of Honor for his outstanding bravery during Wo rld War I,

made his home in Hull's congressional district .

Hull excl�imed:

Mr . Chairman, I desire to call the attention of the House to
the fact that there now sits in the gallery a young man who has
been recognized by all the commanding generals of the Army as
having accomplished the greated individual feat of the recent
Wo rld War, Sergt. Alvin C. York, of Company G, Three Hundred and
1cong . � · , 66 Cong . , 1 seas., 191 .

2 Tom Connally as told to Alfred Steinberg . � � is Tom
Connall y (New Yo rk: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1954), 1 10-111 .

Twenty-eighth Regiment, Eighty-second Division.

[Applause ] 3
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Hull was outspoken in his opinions concerning the post-war problems

encountered by the United States in its relationships with other countries
of the world. On April 9, 1920, he expressed his opposition to the House

Joint Resolution4 "terminating the state of war. declared to e xist Apr il 6 ,
1917, between the Imperial German Government and the United States."

The

resolution was based mainly on condition that reciprocal trade relations
be resumed . 5 He strongly defended President Wilson ' s efforts to negoti

ate a lasting treaty at Versailles, and with equal vehemence condemned
the Senate for its failure to approve its ratification .

After ten months

of delay, Hull, referring to the joint resolution, reluctantly stated

that the House "by means of a purely legislative measure, " was compelled

to use the most necessary and "important part of the treaty-making power

of the Government . " 6 He asserted that the Constitution had given the

President the authority "generally to negotiate commercial treaties."

The duty of Congress, he contended, was to legislate in the form of levies,
collections, and regulations to carry out the commercial treaties .

3I bid . , 199 . On August 20, 1919, Hull unsuccessfully introduced
a bill "authorizing. the President to appoint Alvin Collum York a second
lieutenant and place his name on the retired list with the pay and the
allowances of a second lieutenant of the Regular Army . The bill was re
ferred to the Committee on Military Affairs . I bid . , 4085 . I n future
sessions of Congress, Hull also, without succe�introduced similar bills
authorizing the President to make York a captain. I bid . , 69 Cong . , 1
sess . , 2480 ,
41 bid . ,
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Hull indicated that section three of the bill

0

oste nsibly and

prtendedly" proposed to establish reciprocal trade relations with Germany .
The real purpose of the section, Hull concluded, after he had made a
fair evaluation, was to have the .German government agree to confirm to
the United States and its protectorates the "benefits and advantage s "
which the President and allied countries had forced the German govern
ment to accept in the Treaty of V ersailles.

He held that the resolution

would place the United States in a most unjustifiable position.

Hull

raised the question as to how the United States after it had rejected
the Versailles Treaty, signed by Germany and each of the allied nations,
could now insist that the German government conform only to the parts of
the treaty that benefited the United States?

The use of the words,

United States, he said, "would become a hiss and byword in eve ry civil
ized country on e arth..,, 7 The resolution was passed by both Houses of

Congress, but was vetoed by the President. . The e ffort of the House to
override the President ' s veto failed because of the lack of the neces.
. d s maJority
.
sary two-thir
.8

became Pre sident . 9

It was brought again and passed after Harding

In 192 0 Hull, taken under by the Harding landslide along with
many other Democrats, was defeated in his bid for a seat in the Sixty
seventh Congress .

It was the only political defeat suffered by Hull at

the polls. The loss was caused mostly by the "lukewarmness" of many
71 bid.

8Ibid . , Index, 9776 .

9t bid., 67 Cong . , 1 sess., Index, 399 .
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Democrats toward the Wilson administration. Hull sought to arouse voter
support within his Fourth Congress ional District, but nevertheless many

.
. h staying
Democrats were content wit
at home. 10 Women, .exercising their

suffrage right for the first time in Tennessee, largely failed to support

Hull.

It is interest ing that the previous year Hull had voted in Con

gress against woman suffrage . 11

The result was that a Republican, Wayne

Clouse, won by 390 votes. Two years later, while carrying nine of

thirteen counties in his district, Hull defeated the incumbent Clouse by

a majority of nearly 6, 000 votes.

In previous years the normal Demo-

cratic majority had been 3, 500 votes. 12

In November, 19 21, Hull accepted the unsought and thankless posi

tion of his party's chairmanship. Since the party had divided over the

reelection of its chairman, George H. White, a backer of Governor Cox,

Hull was chosen as an acceptable compromise cand idate, much due to the

During the Democratic Convention of 1920,
13
The
Hull had not closely allied himself with any of the candidates.
support of Carter Glass .

� York Times, in commending the Democrats on their selection in an

editorial, stated that Hull "has no part in the premature ambitions of

any Democrats who are casting sheep's eyes at the White House."
10Hull,

2E · .£!! · ,

I, 105- 106 .

1 1� � � ' November 9, 1 920.

12 Knoxville News-Sentinel, November 8, 1922.
1 3New � � ' November 2, 19 21.

The
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paper declared that the new chairman ' s main task was to ele ct a Demo

cratic House in 192 2 . 14

For a number of years Hull had been a member of the executive

committee, and had become very familiar with the inner workings of the
organization.

For the next three years, the last one of which was served

after he regained his seat in the House , the Chairman of the Democratic

National Committee worked tirelessly and unceasingly for the good of his ·
party. 15

Chairman Hull was in part responsible for the revitalizing of

the party following the Harding landslide, as evidenced by the splendid

Democratic showing in the election of 192 2.

While chairman of the Democratic National Committee, Hull was

often called upon to express the party's viewpoints on prevailing issues

of the period .

In March, 192 1, he prepared an article entitled "Economic

Consequences of the Defeat of the Peace Treaty . " 16 The defeat of the

Treaty of Versailles, Hull believed, had delayed conditions of peace the
world over for two years. He observed that the refusal of America,

neutral countries, and other strong nations to cooperate economically

with the states of central and eastern Europe had resulted in the "wor ld

cataclysm . " He indicated that it was the "unbiased judgment of states

men, economists, financiers, and business men" 17 throughout the world
14I bid., November 3, 192 1 .

15 Hull , � · cit . , I, 113- 115.
1 6cong .
17 rbid .

� · , 67 Cong . , 1 se es., Appendix, 8844.

f

8847

I

67

that if the needful sections of Europe had been properly aided, the

chaotic conditions of that time could have been avoided. Hull concluded:
The most charitable comment that can be made on the conduct
of these Republican leaders is that if they thus willfully and
deliberately and knowingly wrecked the peace , the political,
social, and economic order in many parts of the world, the act
of so doing constitutes the blackest of all black crimes com
mitted in the annals of the human race . 18

In January, 1922, Chairman Hull was the guest of honor at a Jack

son Day dinner given by the Tennessee Society .

Attending were pro�inent

Democrats such as Bernard Baruch and William G . McAdoo.

For the occa

sion Hull chose his favorite subject--the need for the United States to

call a world trade conference to help restore economically depleted

nations. The speech and seemingly gala event received wide coverage by

the New York Times. 19

Among the most intricate problems before Congress during the

twenties was the collection of loans which the United States had made

to the Allies after 1917 and during their initial stage of reconstruc

tion.

The American government looked upon these loans as genuine--no

different from the loan of one person to another- -and expected them to
be paid back.

On the other hand, Europeans felt the United States had

entered the war late ; her casualty list was slight ; much of the loans

had been spent on United States goods ; and they believed the American

government was prosperous enough to be able to forget the matter.

Con

gress was unwilling to oblige, and in 1922 formed the World War Foreign
18 1 bid.

19New � Times, January 6, 1922.
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Debt Commission, which made agreements with fifteen Allied nations be-

tween 1923 and 192 6. 20 The settlements were arranged in accordance with
capacity to pay; thus , Italy's interest rate was a meager 0 . 4 per cent ,

whereas , more prosperous England's rate was 3.3 per cent.2 1

Hull regained his seat in the Sixty-eighth Congress , and on

January 14 , 1926 , he spoke in opposition before the Sixty-ninth Cong ress
to the proposed bill for the settlement of the Italian debt.

22

He and

Henry Rainey of Illinois were the dissenting members of the Ways and

Means Committee . 2 3 The Italian nation owed the United States government
$ 2 , 04 2 , 000 , 000.

5
The bill , as proposed before the House 2 4 and enacted , 2

extended the debt over a sixty-two year period ; provided for payment of

interest and principal totaling $ 2 , 407 , 000 , 000 ; and declared for the

first five years a nominal $5 , 000 , 000 installment on the principal and a

moratorium on the discharge of interest. 2 6

Hull opposed the bill for the settlement of the I ta l ian debt on

the grounds that the 6 2 -year payment plan , with an assumed interest rate
of

per cent , 2 7 the current rate received by holders of United States

4 - 1/4

20

21

Freidel , � · cit. ,

2 36.

Hicks , et ,!! , , £2 · cit. , 449.

�. , 69 Cong. , 1 seas. , 2 055.
23N'ew � � , January 7 , 1926.
22

2 4Cong . �. , 69 Cong. , 1 seas. ,

25
27

I bid. , I ndex , 71 4.

�. , 2057.

2 066.

2 6 I bid. , 7902-7903.

69

war bonds , 28 would amount to a total debt of more than $ 5, 500, 000, 000 .

By subtracting $ 2, 407, 000, 000, the proposed amount for I taly to pay, from
the "true" debt of $ 5 , 500 , 000, 000, Hull emphasized that the United States

taxpayers would actually pay a sum of $ 3, 093, 000,000 of the total debt .

This, he observed , namounts to $7, 000, 000 for each of the 435 congres

sional districts of the United States. " 29 He also noted that if I taly

were to pay portions of the $ 2, 407, 000, 000 settlement, as proposed, less
than one-fourth would be paid during the following thirty-one years .

The rema inder, Hull exclaimed, would be "transferred to that nebulous,

faraway period of time which embr·aces the next generation, " a period
over which men of today do not have full contro1 . 30

Hull stated that when the bill was before the House Ways and

Means Committee, he had advocated as an alternative giving I taly a mora

torium on payment of both interest and principal for s ix years , reducing

the debt some 50 to 60 per cent of the aggr·egate, and then letting the

two governments reach a satisfactory agreement as to payment of interest

and principal .

He contended that the United Stat.es, by the continuation

of the moratorium for s ix years , could save over half or $ 2,000, 000, 000

of the I talian debt, with interest included at 4-1/4 per cent.

Hull be

lieved the per iod of moratorium would enable the United States to be in

a better position to gauge more accurately I taly ' s ability to pay . 31
28I bid . , 7894 .
30I bid . , 20 58 .

291 bid . , 205 7-2058 .
31 I bid . , 2060.
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Hull, too, on available statistical evidence, assumed that during
the six-year period , I taly v s busine ss would prosper and her wealth would
increase .

Therefore, he thought I taly's capacity to refund the debt

would be enlarged .

32

He also injected the idea of the need for a f avor�

able balance of trade . He asserted that I taly's e xternal debt would
never be paid as long as an unfavorable balance of trade e xisted .

This

unfavorable balance, he felt, was caused by the high protective tariff s
which had been recently enacted by the United States .

33

Obviously, the war resulted in a great deal of confiscated prop
erty by both the United States and its enemie s--Ge nnany, Austria, and
Following the war, negotiations were held to make an agree able

Hungary.

settle ment for the lost property .

On December 16, 192 6, Hull spoke in

the House concerning a bill for the settlement of property between

American nationals 34 and German nationals . 3 5
32

1 bid . , 2062 .

34

His speech said little

33

1 bid . , 2 060-2061 .

The term national, strictly defined, re fers to a person who
owes allegiance to a country but is not a citizen of that country .
American nationals are given most of the protections which citizens
have, " and the actual distinction is hazy . " When Congress legislates
"the status of nationals to people it identifies them as belonging to
and entitled to the protection of the United States, particularly for
the purpose of international relations . " Jack C. Plano and Milton
Greenberg, � American Political Dictionary (New York : Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, I nc. , 1962 ) , 49-50 .
35The term, German national, as used in the proposed bill, re
ferred to "an individual who, on April 6, 1917 , was a citiz en or sub
ject of Germany, or who, on the date of the enactment of this act, is
a citizen or subject of Ge rmany . " Cong . �· , 69 Cong . , 2 sess., 594 .

spe cifically about the proposed bill,

36
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but was mostly concerned with an

indictment of the past and present Republican administrations for their
me thods of handling the Ge rman financial indebtedness to the United States .
In the procurement of "army occupation cost s , and claims of their respec
tive nationals," Hull sought to prove that from the beginning, 1919 , the
American government held "aloof and isolated u 3 7 as compared to coopera
tion and unity on the part of the allied nations.
Hull retold how the United States had failed to ratify the Ver
sailles treaty of peace signed by the allied nations with Germany in
19 19, and in 19 21, acting separately, had negotiated a treaty of peace
with Germany. This separate treaty, the Berlin treaty of ' 19 2 1, included
each of the terms concerning army occupation costs and claims of Ameri
can nationals as accepted by the allied nations in the Treaty of Ver
sailles.

Thus, the United States sought to deal directly with the German

government, whereas, the allied nations worke d together and re ceived
through the Reparations Commission the major share of their army occupa
tion costs. Hull declared that the United States received nothing in
the form of reparations, due to failure to " request or accept payment"
through both the Reparations Commission and the provisions of the Berlin

treaty . 38 He also stated that the allied governments, acting under
36

The basic plan of the proposed bill was that 80 per cent of
the total value of property, including intere st, both of Ame rican and
German claimants, would be returned in the form of money. The remain
ing 20 per cent, with interest, would be set aside in a de ferred class
and would share a percentage of the payments of the Dawes plan. I bid . ,
602 .
37

1 bid., 60 5 .

381 bid .
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specific articles of the Versailles treaty, between 1919 and 1 925 e stab
lished cle aring offices for the settlement of the claims of nationals on
both sides of the war. He observed that during the more than five ye ars
of operation, the cle aring offices settled the majority of the claims;
where as, the United States having declined to use eithe r the cle aring
office operation under the Versailles treaty or the Berlin treaty natu
rally received nothing.39

Hull, during the same speech, told of the reluctance of the United
States government to allow complete cooperation of the nation's repre
sentatives to the various conferences for the arrangement of repara
tions payments. He referred to the fact that the separate tre aty of
pe ace with Germany, the Berlin treaty, carried a Senate rese rvation not
allowing the representation of the United States on the Reparations Com
mission without the approval of Congress.

He noted that the Ame rican

delegates who attended the London reparations conference in July, 1 92 4,
to conside r the Dawes report for reparations payments were ve ry limited
in their scope to act, and for fe ar of "involvement" refused to sign

the f inal act.40

Continuing, Hull recalled that a conference was he ld in Paris
in January, 1925, for the purpose of agreeing to the distribution of
portions of the German reparations to the allied nations, and that , as
the conference approached, the United States was divided between a desire
39Ibid.

40t bid.
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to secure part of the reparations payments and the same fear o f "involve
ment. " At this point, Hull said, our nation took a closer look at the

Dawes plan as adopted by the London conference.

The act provided that

payments from Germany could be received only from reparations payments

provided for by the Dawes Commission.

Thus, the United States was blocked

from receiving any payments direct from Germany under the Berlin treaty.

I t was under these conditions, Hull contended, that the American govern
ment quickly acted to secure permission for its representatives to act

as official delegates to the Paris conference. 41

"As the only way out of a bad situation," and because it . was not

the fault of the claimants, Hull declared he would vote for the pending

bill.

He said, "I shall never be able to excuse the stupidity and out

rageous negligence of our Government in handling its claims and the

claims of nationals . 11 42

it.

The bill passed the House with Hull voting for

Although the bill was debated before the Senate, it was never voted

upon. 43 During the following session of Congress, a similar bill in

cluding the nations of Austria and Hungary, as well as Germany, was suc
cessfully enacted into law. 44 Hull played no part in that bill.

During those Republican congressional years , Hull continued to

voice his opinions concerning the financial operations of the govern

ment.

On May 31, 1919, within the immediate postwar era, Hull made a
41Ibid .

42
I bid., 607.

43t bid. , I ndex , 309.
441 bid . , 70 Cong. , 1 sess. , Index , 684.
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speech in support

74
of an attempted repeal of the luxury tax4 6 which had

been recently extended .4 7

Before he stated his reason for advocating

the repeal of the tax measure, he made a lively attack aimed mostly upon
48
·
Representative
J . Hampton Moore o f P e nnsy 1 vania,
w ho moments b e f ore
.

had delivered an address before the House . Hull asserted :
I must say that I ge t a little weary when some gentlemen
persist in interrupting the real business of the House by
attempting to play what some people would say was cheap poli
tics--raising the question of politics in every conceivable
little way--was this a Democratic bill, was it introduce d by
a Republican or a Democrat? My God ! We have more problems
to solve than our entire joint wisdom can possibly solve, and
I say ·it is discouraging, when many of us on both sides have
been earnestly striving jointly to work out some of these prob
lems, to be constantly interrupted by gentle men whose chief
mission seems to be to play politics . In my opinion, unle ss
some of that is suppressed during the next 18 months , the
country will not be subjected to any greater menance from the
I . W. W . and the anarchists than it will f rom the professional
politicians. [Applause on the Democratic side J 4 9
In his denunciation of the luxury tax, Hull claimed that the
method was impractical due to its many administrative comple xities .

He

indicated that the measure required the burdensome and unnecessary in
volvement of millions of clerks and salesmen in the application of the
various rates on the many article s subje ct to the tax.

He also be lieved

another method of taxation, less expensive, should be devised for the

so
1 uxury c 1 ass o f e xpend itures.
.
45 I bid . ,
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Cong . , 1 sea s . , 483-485 .

46I bid . , I ndex, 9722 .

48 I bid. , Index, 9235 .
5 0i bid .
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49 I bid . , 484 .

I n a highly partisan speech before the House, Hull, on May 25,

75

1920, bitterly criticized the Republican Party for its fiscal policies.

He sought to prove by statistical evidence that the Democratic Party
had always practiced economy, whereas the Republican Party had been

traditionally the party of extravagance. He contended that a Democratic

Congress could be "expected and relied upon to bring about speedy, com

prehensive, and equitable reforms in the present system of war taxa
tion."

He thus concluded that only a Democratic Congress could develop

a suitable and effective p rogram of peace-time taxation . 5 1

I n the meantime , Hull was defeated for reelection to the House

and became chairman of the Democratic National Conunittee .

In this pos i

tion, he wisely continued to use his vast amount of financial knowledge.

His first public statement was that the party "will pay debts promptly. " 5 2

The financial leader had become the party ' s chairman when its treasury
was near bankruptcy--an accumulated $ 300, 000 of debts . 5 3 During this

time only a few men such as Bernard M. Baruch, William Jennings Bryan,

and Thomas L. Chadbourne , New York lawyer, gave generous financial

assistance to the party. Baruch descri bed the financial dilemma that
the "competent and conscientious" Hull faced by a letter written from

Hull to him on November 12 , 1923:
5 1I bid., 2 sess . , 7613.

52New York Times, November 3, 1921 .

5 11u11, ££· cit . , I , 1 16 .
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I am still writing my own checks for more or le ss substantial
amounts every week in order to squeeze by the weeke nd . This, of
course , has crucified me in my efforts to do the real things that
I should have been doing on as nearly a hundred per cent basis as
possible during past months . I shall continue to hold on with a
death grasp, however , and do the maximum amount of work possible
on a shoestring . 54
Following much hard work, upon his resignation , Hull could boast of a
surplus of $30,000 .

Thus , Hull took over the chairmanship of the party

at its lowe st ebb , both politically and financially , and along w ith
55
.
' h.
othe r de d.icate d Democrats greatly assiste
re birt
d in
' its
'

While chairman of the Democratic Party, Hull on many occasions
voiced the party ' s viewpoint concerning the financial conditions of the
nation.

I n � eptember, 1923 , The Congressional Digest published an

article written by Hull entitled "The Democrats Challenge the Re publican
Tax Record."

I n an obviously partisan article, he contended that the

Democrats by February, 1919, had reduced war taxes $2 ,000,000,000 be l ow
those of the previous year . The Democratic leader concluded that the
Harding administration, now in its third year, had only made reductions
of $850,000,000.

Hull state d that the major part of this sum was the

result of tax reductions on the weal thy class. 5 6

Upon returning to the Sixty-eighth Congress, Hull, on Fe bruary 7,
192 5 , made the longest speech of his career in the House of Represents54Bernard Baruch, The Public Years (New York:
Wins ton, I nc., 1950), 175.55Hull, � · cit. , I , 113- 116.

Holt , Rinehart and

56cordell Hull , "The Democrats Challenge the Republican Tax Record "
1
The Congress ional Digest, I I (September, 1923), 353.
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tives. Although his address was slanted, needles to say, towards the

Democratic viewpoint, the speech was a penetrating analysis of the

government's fiscal policies between 1913 and 1925. The address, mostly

pertaining to fiscal measures during World War I , covered thirteen pages
in the Congressional Record . 5 7

Senator Carter Glass of Virginia, 58 who

was Secretary of the Treasury under President Wilson and who was a close
59
personal friend of Hull,
told the Tennessee Congressman that he re-

mained awake all night reading and studying the speech. 60

During the address, Hull called attention to the tax reduction

claims made by the opposing political party.

He made specific reference

to President Coolidge's remark that the American citizens' taxes had

been substantially reduced by nearly $ 2, 000, 000, 000 in each of the last

four years. Hull asserted that "some careless subordinate has greatly

misled the President. " He believed that in actuality the tax reductions

had amounted to nothing since large amounts of taxes had only "been
shifted but not reduced . "

Hull indicated that internal taxes were re

duced while at the same time higher tariff taxes were legislated which
imposed a comparable levy. 61

On December 9, 192 5 , Hull entered the House debate on the general

revenue bill for the fiscal year 1926 .

In a lengthy discussion on

57Cong . � - , 68 Cong . , 2 sea s . ,
3249 - 3262 .

58 t bid , , I ndex, 3.
6 0� . , 12 4 .

59Hul l , � · � . , I , 72 ,

61 Cong , !!£ · , 68 Cong . , 2 see s . , 3260 .
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taxation, he urged that the existing maximum estate tax should remain at
25 per cent ; the maximum income surtax at 25 per cent ; the exemption for

married persons should be lowered from $3, 500 to $ 2, 500 and include an
exemption of $400 for each dependent ; a tax of 2 to 3 per cent on the

undistributed profits of corporations, but never greater than 3 per cent ;
reduction of taxes to the extent of $350, 000, 000 ; and the repeal of the

wartime automobile and admission taxes. 62 He supported the p roposed
revenue bill, 63 which became law on February 26, 1926 .

The Revenue Act

of 1926 provided for a maximum estate tax and income surtax of 20 per

cent ;

an exemption for married persons of $3, 500 with a credit of $400

for each dependent ; no tax on undistributed profits of corporations ; re
duction of taxes to nearly $400, 000, 000 ; the lowering of automobile

excise taxes from 5 to 3 per cent ; and the decreasing of the admission
taxes from 10 per cent on admissions over 50 cents to 10 per cent on

admissions over 75 cents.64

Hull, in the same speech, in regard to past inefficient methods

of taxation, advocated greater cooperation among the federal, state, and

local governments.

He insisted that definite l ines of division for

62 r bid. , 69 Cong. , 1 sess. , 565. Hull believed that by the con
tinuance ofthe maximum surtax and estate tax, the $ 1, 500 exemption for
single persons, and the $3, 500 exemption fo r married couples with the $500
credit for each dependent, the automobile and admission taxes would not
be needed . I bid . Hull, too , express ed his opinion that married couples
without dependents should be "lightly taxed ." He believed that the amount
of the exemption on a graduated income tax structure should be established
near the "minimum subsistence" level . I bid. , 882 .
631 bid. , 1164- 1165 .

64r bid. , 70 Cong . , 1 sess . , 10811- 10817.
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jurisdictional purposes should be e stablished so as to promote the
greatest utilization of tax resources . 65

He outlined the following

program:
1 . The federal government which nee ded $3 � 000 , 000 , 000 for the
current fiscal ye ar should make the income tax its chie f revenue
producing method . Customs , tobacco , estate taxes not needed by
the states , oleomargerine , alcohol , and when totally necessary a
limited system of stamp taxes should be applie d as additional
sources .
2 . The states should use the inheritance tax to the fullest
possible degree . Revenue derived from gasoline , license , and
other automobile taxes should approximate $300 , 000 , 000 . A flat
tax levy of 1 to 2 per cent should be applied on one's personal
income , thereby taxing both the "intangi ble and tangible p rope rty
holder . " S tates should also use special assessment measures ,
license , occupation , and othe r minor taxe s .
3 . The municipalities should secur e their main income from
real estate taxes in addition to special assessments , fees ,
sales , license , and other minor business taxes . 66
On December 10 , 192 7 , Hull again asserted that the Republicans
had levied more taxes than the Democrats .

Speaking before the House ,

he proudly noted that it was a Democratic Congress in February , 1919 ,
which reduced internal taxes from the wartime high of $6 , 000 , 000 , 000
to $4 , 000 , 000 , 000 .

He observed that the "so-called tax reduction acts

of 192 1 , 1924 , and 1926" had decreased tax levies by an e stimated sum
of $1 , 604 , 000 , 000 .

The significant point made by Hull was that during

the same time the Harding and Coolidge administrations had incre ased the
tariff rates to yield an additional $3 , 000 , 000 , 000 to $4 , 000 , 000 , 000.
He also pointed out that the federal expenditures between 192 2 and 192 8
65r bid . , 69 Cong . , 1 sess . , 564-565 .
66I bid . , 565 .
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had been reduced by only $ 169, 000, 000 . 67

Hull, too, chose to criticize the great amount of popular talk

concerning "Coolidge economy" and the accomplishments of Andrew Mellon,

Secretary of the Treasury.

While recalling that Coolidge became Presi

dent in August, 1923, Hull stated that federal expenditures for the fis

cal year ending June 30, 1924, were $3, 506, 000, 000 .

He then observed

that the estimated expenditures for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1928 ,

were $3, 626, 000, 000, or an increase of $ 120, 000, 000.

"Further comment, "

Hull declared , "is unnecessary. 1 1 68 As for Secretary of the Treasury,

Andr.ew Mellon, Hull felt that he was far from worthy of the Republicans'

praise, which would make him of comparable stature to Alexander Hamilton.
"The honest truth , " Hull maintained, was that the problems encountered

by Mellon since 1921 had been "simple and easy" in regard to the condi

tions which he had inherited. 69 Thus, Hull believed that the Democrats

had paved the way for Mellon ' s success.

In the same speech, Hull further stated that the interest rate on

the war debt had been much higher during the years of Republican admin

istration than during the Democratic years.

The Wilson administration ,

he pointed· out, had stabilized the long-term war debt on a maximum

support level of 4- 1/4 per cent interest rate .

Hull as s e r ted that the

4� 1/4 per cent ceiling was fixed even though outspoken representatives
67!lli · , 70 Cong. , 1 sess. , 433-434.
68!ill •

,

434 .

69 I bid. , 435 .
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of financial institutions had p ressed for a rate as high as

4½

per cent .

Thus , he declared that the nation v s taxpayers were saved billions of
dollars.

He stated that millions of dollars were lost when the Harding

and Coolidge administrations allowed the banks to e stablish the interest
rates of government securities.

He further stated that the greatest

amount of interest paid was not obtained until the fiscal year 1923,

fou r years after the war, when the Harding administration paid

$ 1, 056, 000, 000 interest, as compared with $ 1, 020, 000, 000 for 1920 under
President Wilson .

Hull then presented statistical evidence showing that

the highest rates of interest on the public de bt, following the war , had
. Repu blican
. . 70 He condemned the
. .
'
occurred during
years o f administration

Republican Party for being unable to scale the inte rest rate below 4 per
cent in 1927, eight years after the war.7 1

Four days later, before the same body, turning his attention to

the federal inhe ritance tax, Hull greatly criticized those who would
relinquish the tax on the grounds of state rights ,

Hull avowed that

he he ld in high regard those who honestly championed state rights , but
questioned those individuals who would us e the theory as a protection
for the unjustifiable avoidance of tax payment .

"State rights, " Hull

upheld, "doe s [siq] not mean the exemption of wealth f rom its fair share
of taxes. "72 He repeated the argument he had used while advocating the

70 1 bid . , 434-43 5 . The average rate s of inte rest between the f is 
cal yearsof19 19 and 1927 were a s fol lows : 19 19, 4 . 10 pe r cent ; 1921,
4 . 29 ·pe r cent ; 1922, 4 . 29 per cent ; 192 3, 4 . 22 per cent ; 1924 , 4 . 2 1 pe r
cent ; 192 5 , 4 . 14 per cent ; 1926, 4. 0 9 pe r c ent ; and 1927 , 3 . 9 6 pe r cent .
!ill · , 43 5 .
7 1I bid .

12

!,lli

. , 63 6 .
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passage of the first federal inheritance tax in 1916 that within eight
months after the state of New York had increased its inheritance tax

rates only a small amount, $400,000, 000 was .transferred into states with
lower rates.

Thus, Hull concluded, an obvious peculiarity of many of

those of substantial wealth was a "roving disposition" or "migratory

habits. 1 1 73

The greater portion of Hull's speeches in Congress during his

tenure between 1919 and 1931 were connected with the tariff issue.

During this period the Republicans backed mostly by large business in

terests made successive efforts to raise the tariff to protect American

industry and supposedly protect the agriculture economy .
decidedly upward, were passed .

Several tariffs ,

Time and agai� before the House, Hull

directed a steady stream of attack upon the Republicans for their advo

cacy of higher tariffs.

His first criticism came on December 9, 1919,

when he opposed the passage of an antidumping bill. 74 The bill, which

failed to pass, was presented by its many supporters as a means of pro

tecting the American manufacturers and their wage earners from the effects
of depreciated currencies abroad·.

Hull felt differently; he believed

the country would be unable to increase domestic production and

expand

foreign trade if the United States chose to erect artificial barriers .

He declared:

Prices are high in the United States, and the enactment of a
comprehensive, inflexible antidumping law such as is now proposed
73I bid.

74I bid. , 66 Cong. , 2 sess. , I ndex, 9720.
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will have a tendency to sustain and increase rather than de
crease existing high prices . This is no time to stimulate or
increase prices to the American consumers and to the American
manufact�rers as to raw materials and semimanufactured products
when they are already artificially high, when ours is the only
country that has surpluses in important lines, and when the
world not only has nothing to dump upon us but nothing to sell
to us except, in the main, raw materials, products for further
use in manufacturing, and noncompetitive articles. . . . In
this period of high prices at home we can, to a real advantage
rather than to any detriment, buy virtually anything the world
has to sell and at such prices as may be offered . We want to
lower prices rather than raise prices at present. 75

Once again, on December 22, 1920, Hull spoke against increasing

the tariff .

On that occasion it was in opposition to a bill calling

for an emergency tariff to impose duties on specific agricultural

products. Following World War I, the prices of many farm products

had decreased, when the abnormal wartime market came to an end, and a

number of congressmen believed tariff protection was the . remedy .

Hull

stated that the United States was now exporting $ 8 , 000, 000 , 000 , of

which one-half was agricultural products, and the Department of Agricul
ture anticipated a surplus in the future which must be sold abroad .

Thus, Hull questioned the belief that increased tariff barriers would
solve the problem of increased surpluses that could only be sold out

side the United States . 76

Hull pointed out the need for European nations to function eco

nomically in a normal manner, which could be accomplished only by recip

rocal cooperation between the United States and the countries of Europe.
751 bid. , Appendix, 8743.

76I bid . , 3 sess . , 632.
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For at that time most of the European nations had w i tnessed a loss of
some 30 to 40 per cent of the ir productive power.

He reasoned that for

the European nations to re turn to an appropriate level of economic
activity would require our nation to make available its surplus foods
and raw materials at reasonable prices of exchange.

He stre ssed that

our country must buy from fore ign nations in order to supply the m the
necessary credits to purchase Uni ted States products . By the e stablish
ment of this policy, Hull believed that normal international trade could
be resumed.77

Continuing in the same speech, Hull emphasize d the spe cial sig
nificance of the proposed tariff, and declare d :
I n the language of President William McKinley, the period of
e xclusivene ss is past . The expansion of our trade and comme rce
is the pressing problem . Notwi thstanding every true sign and
wise warning to the contrary, the fight for reaction, for e x
clusiveness, and for economic isolation is now on . The sudden
appearance of this hastily constructed high tariff bill was the
signal for all the forces of stand-pat protection and of greed
and selfishness to rally in a grand e ffort to ge t both the ir arms
and the ir fee t into the Federal Treasury. The logrollers behind
this and other like high-tariff bills make the pork barrel log
rollers drop their heads in shame . No person or business can
become a beneficiary of one of these general high pro te ctive
tariff l aws without joining with other beneficiaries, no matte r
how undeserving or e xtortionate, and upholding the ir demands . I
am persuaded that the proponents of this me asure, while recog
niz ing i ts utter futility as a remedy for the present distress
of the farmers, have rushed i t before Congress for the purpose
of exciting the favorable inte re st and whe tting the appe tite of
certain whe at raisers and livestock growers, bean, peanut, onion,
and other raisers of certain agriculture products, to the extent
that they will next spring demand that the ir representatives here
give the ir support not only to the prote ctive- tariff i te ms affect
ing them at home but to the entire high protective tariff measure
the reactionary Republicans e xpect to lay before Congress ne xt
ye ar . 78
7 7 r bid .

78I bid . , 635 .

85
Hull also brought out the fact that a tariff does not fall alone
on what one eats and wears, but encompasses all types of businesses which
develop a raw material into a finished product.

He pointed out that

these added production costs of the manufacturers were passed onto the

.
u 1timate
consumer. 79 Thus, in effect, . the ·enactment of a higher tariff

would result in an upswing of price levels. He believed virtually all

consumers of goods and services would be forced to share the higher price

levels .

The proposed emergency tariff bill was passed . by both Houses of

Congress, 80 but was vetoed by President Wilson, whose veto message was
read and sustained in the House on March

3,

1921 .

81

President Wilson

vetoed the bill on ground that it would not help the farmer, was designed

only for selfish purposes, woul4 breed monopoly, and would cause many

"to look upon the Government as an instrument for private gain instead

of an instrument for the promotion of the general well being . 118 2

Hull was correct in stating that the protectionists would renew

their efforts the following spring.

President Harding, on May 27, 1921,

less than three months after his inauguration, placed his signature on

an emergency tariff bi11 8 3 passed by a special session of Congress . 8 4
79I bid. , 6 3 7.

81

I bid. , 4519.

I bid . , 6 7 Cong. , 1 sess. ,

83
84

308 4.

carman, et al . ' op . cit. , 479 .

. 8 01 bid. , I ndex, 495 3 .
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The act greatly increased the tariff on agricultural products and carried
antidumping legislation. 85 Midwestern congressmen of both parties, act
ing as a bloc, were instrumental in obtaining the legislation. 86 The

following year, in Sept�mber, 192 2, 87 with the assistance of the farm

bloc, the Emergency Tariff was superseded by the Fordney-McCumber Act. 88

Both laws raised tariff rates to the highest levels yet known, and

measurably insured American producers against effective foreign ·competi

tion . 89

Because of his defeat in November, 1920, Hull was not in Congress

when those laws were passed.

But that did not mean that he had to re

main silent on the tariff issue. When the Fordney-McCumber Act was pend

ing, Hull directed the Democratic opposition to the measure. 90 After the

bill had passed, the highly respected magazine, The �, in its November,

1922, issue, included an article by Hull entitled ''Why a Democratic Con

gress? "

He concluded that due to the rais ing of the tariff, his to ry

would repeat itself .

He stated :

There are historical precedents for the election of a Demo
cratic Congress this year, following the enactment of the infamous
Fordney-McCumber profiteering tariff bill. The McKinley high pro
tective tariff of 1890 cost the Republicans the House that year,
85cong . � · , 68 Cong . , 2 sess. , 3261.

86Freidel, £2 · cit . , 257 .

87cong . !!£ · , 67 Cong . , 2 sese. , 13181.

88Freidel, £2 · cit . , 25 7 .

89Hicks, !! al . , �· cit . , 476-477.
90Hull, ££· cit . , I , 1 1 4.
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and the presidency two years later . The Payne-Aldrich high
protective tariff of 1909 cost the Republicans the House in
1910 and the presidency two years later. History is again
repeating itself. 91

History did not repeat itself , however , until an even higher

tariff was passed in 1930 .

On February 2 2 , 1923 , Chairman Hull de

livered an address in Topeka , Kansas , entitled "The Farmer and the

Tariff."

In this highly partisan speech Hull reviewed the speedy , con

tinued decline of farm prices and presented statistical evidence to prove

that it was due to the enactment of the Emergency Tariff Act , the Fordney

McCumber Act , and the "unsound economic position" held by the Harding
administration.

Since that administration was accountable for far more

failures than accomplishments, Hull insisted the only possibility of re

lief for the . American people was the return of the Democratic Party to

power. He held that the Democratic Party, as it had done before when in

power, would establish a definite program of foreign and domestic policy

and would govern "with vision, constructive ability , and aggressive

leadership" necessary for a satisfactory solution of the problems facing

the nation . 92

I mmediately before Hull returned to Congress, he wrote an article

entitled "Protection Fallacies, " which appeared in the January, 1924,

91cordell Hull, "Why A Democratic Congress?" The �' LXVII I
(November, 1922) , 989.
92 Cong. � - , 67 Cong. , 4 sess., 4667-467 1.
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issue of The Forum magazine. 93

Senator Adrieus A. Jones of New Mexico94

believed the article would aid him in his attempt to reduce taxes by the

lowering of tariff rates. 95

It typified many of Hull's former and future

tariff speeches, and contained his usual denunciations of the Republican
Party for its past and present tariff failures. 9 6

After Hull returned to Congress, he delivered on February 7,

1 9 25, a major speech in which he reviewed the nation ' s fiscal policies

and operations between 1 9 13 and 1 9 25.

He insisted that the increased

tax burdens "due to the radical increases" of the tariff duties were

greater than the amount saved from the lessening of internal revenue

taxes through the revenue acts of 1 92 1 and 1 9 2 4. 9 7

I n specific reference

to the last two tariffs enacted by Republican administrations, he de

clared :

We are the chief source of international credit; we have vast
and unrivaled systems of mass production; the most modernized
machinery, and labor of the highest skill and intelligence in
the .world. Shall we continue to improve our efficiency in manu
facturing and general production, correspondingly lowering our
cost levels, and proceed further to develop and expand our
domestic and international finance, trade, and commerce in a
natural way, or shall we turn away from this inviting picture
and tempting opportunity and pursue the shortsighted and disas
trous course of curtailing production in all lines to our
domestic needs save such excesses as may be disposed of by the
unthinkable process of dumping? The Fordney-McCumber tariff
law is the signboard pointing in this latter direction. 9 8

93cordell Hull , "Protection Fallacies, " The Forum , LXXI (January ,
1924) , 46.
9 4cong.

� · , 68 Cong . , 1 sees. , I ndex 3. Jones obtained the
unanimous consent of the Senate for the inclusion of speech in the Cong.
Rec.
95 � . , 3947 .

97 I bid. , 2 sees. , 324 9 -3262.

96� . , 39 47-3948.
98�. , 3262.
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Hull also commented that the American farmer had " undoubtedly
learned his tariff lesson . "

He claimed that the f armer :

. . . now knows that as to his most important products he has
never received any tariff advantages, while all the time he has
been obliged to pay extortionate tariff prices for what he has
had to buy . He now knows that any industry or business in America
which produces a substantial surplus which must be sold in world
markets can not hope to receive any appreciable tariff benefits;
that so called high protective tariffs have the effect of arti
ficially increasing prices , e xcept as just stated, which is the
prime purpose of those demanding the same; that while the high
tariff creates artificial temporary prosperity for certain indus 
tries, others languish or suffer de pression ; that the high tariff
by preventing other countries from paying for our surplus in part
in goods thereby diminishes the ir purchasing power and lessens
their ability to buy our surplus at the attractive prices fixed
by the undisturbed law of supply and demand . Our foreign trade
is more than $5, 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 less for 1 924 than it was in 1 920 . 99
During the spring of

1 92 6,

Hull opposed the enactment of the

McNary-Haugen Bill favored by those farmers who had supported the enact 10 0
. .
ment of the e xisting
tari. ffs.

The McNary-Haugen Bill was designed to

establish a federal farm board to assist in the "orderly marketing, con
trol, and dis position of the agricultural surpluses. 11 10 1

Upon receiving

the surplus, the government would sell it at the world price .

An equali

zation fee, levied on the farmer, would be established for the difference
between the domestic and world price.

Thus the farmer would receive the

fixed price minus the equalization fee . 1 0 2
991 bid.

lO O l bid. , 69 Cong . ,
101
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sess . , 9 1 0 1 .

1 bid . , I ndex, 793.
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The measure was supported by Senator Tom Walsh and Bernard

90

Baruch. Baruch believed the bill should be given a test on at least one

commodity. Alongside Hull, although in the Senate, stood Senators Walter

George, Georgia ; Joseph Robinson, Arkansas; and Pat Harrison, Mississippi .
Baruch wrote that Hull embodied the "free trade sentiment" of most of the

Southern Democrats when he sa id to him "that he could not support a bil l
which relied on the tariff to help the farmer . " 103 Hull, in the House,

opposed the measure, as he felt that the proposed bill would not be work
able , beneficial, or fair to the farmer. In regard to the fact that our

country h�d only recently passed antidumping . legislation, he largely

opposed the bill in view of the section calling for a permanent system

of dumping . 104

in the House . 105

By a vote of 212 nays to 167 yeas, the bill·was defeated

It was during the first half of 1926, while Hull continued to at

tack the tariff and the Republican Party, that the Review of Reviews

carried an article describing the various leaders of the House, including

Hull .

The article was written by William Hard, a Washington writer for

various periodica ls, who depicted Hu l l in the fol lowing manner :

Hull might now be chairman of the Ways and Means Committee,
except that he missed out on one Congress in the course of his
service of nine Congresses. He is an infinite ( and an infinitely
a ble) specialist on the tariff . He is deeply solemn but pro
foundly amiable. With all his amiableness, he remains convinced,
however, that sinister powers of horrible iniquity have dictated
the Republican tariff policy of this country. He seems to hate
no individual Republican . He simply, morally, and impersonally
103Baruch, �- cit . , 167 .

1041 bid . , 9101.

l O Slbid. , 9862-9863.
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hates the who l e Repub l ican party and the tariff . He has dug
out information about the tariff ti l l his shou l ders stoop
under it and his conscience writhes and rises under it . A
gent l e-spirited, re l ent l ess, and remorse l ess Christian
crusader . Perfect l y inva l uab l e to his fe l l ow-Democrats on
the tariff issue . 10 6
As the years progressed, the McNary-Haugen Bi l l continued to be
presented before Congress .

Both in

192 7

and in

1 928,

the bi l l was passed

by both houses of Congress10 7 on l y to be vetoed by President Coo l idge as
" economical l y u�sound ." l O S

O n February

1 5,

192 7 ,

whi l e speaking before

the House, Hu l l dec l ared that he had "never given any bi l l any more
earnest and sympathetic study" than the proposed McNary-Haugen Bi l l .

In

opposition to the proposed measure, Hu l l argued that the bil l was a con
tinuation of the Fordney-McCumber high tariff, and that eight-five per
cent of the American people gained no benefits from tariff protection,
1 09
.
but were on1 y inJ' ured by the tari. ff.

Hu l l , in addition to arguments presented in previous sessions of
Congress, questioned the constitutiona l ity of the McNary-Haugen Bill .
pointed out that a l l

l aws

He

and judicia l decisions to that date had held

that a tax shou l d be levied by the federa l government for a " general pub
lic purpose" and returned to the treasury with other tax revenue . He
stated that the equalization fee, 1 1 0 as proposed, would be

l evied

on l y

on the farmers producing the enumerated commodities in the pending bill ,
10

6wu liam Hard , "Leadership in the House, " The American Review
of Reviews , LXXIV (August , 1926) , 163.
l07Freidel , � cit. , 259 .

lO SHicks,
l 09

!!

al . , � - cit . , 480 .

cong . !!£ · , 69 Cong . , 2 sess. , 3895.

11 0

see footnote 92 for a description of the term, equalization .

92

and in . turn would be applied to the entire losses of the surpluses sold
abroad. Thus , Hull doubted the constitutionality of both the levying
and the disbursement of the proposed equalization tax.111

Hull, too, felt that when acceptable prices were guaranteed a
producer, as the McNary-Haugen Bill proposed, invariably production increases would follow, thereby creating added surpluses .

Although the

section seeking to force compulsory cooperation among the farmers allowed
for their consent through voting in state convention, Hull opposed the
measure.

He believed that America was not "ripe " for compulsion, and

referred to the section as "absurd and unworkable."

He also regarded

the bill as impractical in view of its "technicalities, comple xities,
and artificialness."
During the same speech, Hull presented an outline of this House

.
. 1ture re 1ie
· f .112
·
for agricu
Reso1ution
ca11ing

He had formally intro-

duced the House Resolution on January 13, 192 7 , 113 which stated that
legislative measure and economic policies" should be enacted for the
"relief and recognition of agriculture."

The points of the resolution

were as follows :
1. Tariff reduction, there by materially diminishing the
farme r 's cost of production , transportation, and his cost of
living.
2. International trade agreements , e liminating by mutual
consent the harsher forms of discrimination in trade or com
merce, and the deve lopment of more liberal trade relations
with broader and better foreign markets.
111cong. �- , 69 Cong., 2 sess., 3895 - 3896.

112 I bid., 3896.

1 13!bid., 1633.
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3. Financial and other aid and encouragement of e fficiency
in agriculture and in the wider expansion and deve lopment of
cooperative organizations in e ach branch of the agricultural
industry for the purposes of transport�tion and marketing, and
also production to the extent practicable and desirable.
4. Continued e xemption from antitrust laws of farm coopera
tive organiz ations or associations .
5 . Any additional and more desirable short-term and other
credit facilities, actually nee ded and justified by good busine ss
principles.
6. Reduction and readjustment of railway rates, especially
as to agricultural products.
7 . Abolition by the States of State taxes on farm lands, with
the possible retention of a small rate for schools, · 1eaving the
same state tax to counties and villages.
8. Systematic suppression of monopolies in the distribution
of farm products.
9. Speedy enactment for temporary re lief purposes of H. R.
1565 5, the Aswell bill, or H. R . 15 963, the Crisp bill, 114 with
certain amendments, for the purchase and orderly marketing of the
surplus of the principal basic agricultural commodi ties,. and the
stabilization of prices on a reasonable basis.
10. The greater utilization of the Mississippi and other
important water courses for the transportation of farm products,
and the fullest utilization of water power on farms and for farm
purposes. 115
During this period Hull be came widely known as a possible pre s i
dential candidate.

The consideration of Hull as a prospe ctive candidate

began following his election as chairman of the Democratic National Com
mittee.
tion.

I n this high position, he was able to capture national atten
He was known by many , regardless of their political identity, as

114Both bills south to establis h a federal farm board to assist
agriculture in an effective and systematic distribution of surplus com
modities. I bid. , I ndex, 319, 3 2 3.
1151 bid. , 3896.
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a sound financial legislator, and for this reason he became a formidable

presidential candidate.

Early in 1923 he was mentioned as presidential

timbre by his home state , but he requested the Tennessee legislature not

. for the presi.dency. 116 The national convention met in
to endorse h im
the summer of 1924, and during . the deadlock between William G . McAdoo

and Alfred E. Smith, there was talk of Hull as a compromise candidate . 1 17

He was informed by Austin Peay, Governor of Tennessee, that the "in

siders" were in conference to determine which of two candidate to nomi

nate--Hull or John W . Davis . 118 Davis was nominated.

A s the 1928 convention approached, Hull, in September, 1927, was

again boomed for the presidency by his home state, and he passively

accepted the endorsement.

Tennessee was fearful that if Smith, a Cath

olic and "wet, " received the nomination, the state would go Republican.

On the other hand, Hull was both a Protestant and "dry . 1 1 119 The American

Review of Reviews, in March, 1928, published that Southerners were not

ready to concede that Smith ' s nomination was a s. sured.

The article men

tioned that Senators Walter George and Carter Glass and Congressman

Cordell Hull held many votes. 120

Later, based on the same reasoning , he

received support from the North Carolina delegation headed by Senator
116New York Times, March 17, 1923.

117I bid., July 6, 1924.

118Hull, ££ · cit. , I, 122.

119New � Times, September 12, 192
7.

120Albert Shaw, "Southern Preferences, " The American Review of
Reviews, LXVI I (March, 1928), 238 .
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Furnifold M. Simmons .

Hull , too, re vealed his presidential campaign

expenses before the Senate Investigating Committee .

Before the Com

mittee, Hull told that he had spent one thousand dollars personally, but

. butions
.
.
. burse d by private
expecte d to be reim
contri
. 121

As the Smith candidacy appeared assured , in April , 1928 , Hull was
mentioned as a possible vice-presidential candidate .

Many Democratic

leaders held that he would have a substantial influence in border states-Tennessee, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and Missouri-- which would likely go Re
publican . if Smith were nominated .

On May 23, Hull publicly rejected the

idea of accepting se cond place on the ticket.

Soon thereafter, the �

York Times stated that since Smith and a large element of the Democratic
Party were sympathetic to a protecti ve tariff, doubt was cast that the

Tennesseean would make an acceptable running mate . 122

At the convention held in Houston, Texas , Hull was nominated by
Harvey H . Hannah, a railroad executive of Nashville .
by Hannah as the "Andrew Jackson of our time . "

Hull was described

Following the nomination ,

a brief demonstration lasting five minutes took place .

Although the

first roll call was overwhelmingly in favor of Sm ith, Hull captured dele
gate majoritie s from Al abama , North Carolina , Tenness ee, and Virginia.
His

fifty vote s placed him fourth on the lis t , preceded by Senator George

of Georgia and Senator Ree d of Missouri. 123

121New York Time s , May 28, 1928 ; May 8, 1928.

122,!lli . , April 13 , 1928 ; May 23 , 1928 ; June 2 , 1928.
123.!lli · , June 29 , 1928.
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The Democratic Party , as anticipated , under the le adership of
Smith and the influence of Massachusetts and New Jersey, favore d a pro
tective tarif f as part of its 19 2 8 platfonn.

Resisting this movement

with no avail , were Hull and Carter Glass. Glass · related :

"I am· dis

pose d to agree with Hull that, if the Democratic party is to embrace
Republican doctrines , and pe rmit certain Republican states to nominate
its candidate , it had as well disband and go over to the enemy.' 1 12 4

During the campaign, Hull, along with other Southerners, p l ayed
an inactive role in the national ele ction .

Smith had made prohibition

repeal the major issue , and Southern Democratic . me mbers of congress
wisely chose not to identify themselves closely with the "wet" candi
date. They concentrated on their own re elections.

Their judgment

proved correct , as most of the Democratic Southerners , including Hull ,
were returned to Washington. At the same time , Tenne ssee, in addition
to six other states of the South, went Republican in reaction to Smith's
"wetness and other characteristics.11 12 5

On De cember 31 , 192 8 , Hull came in open conflict with Smith and
the chairman of the Democratic National Committee , John J. Raskob , on
their views on the tariff issue. S mith felt the party was on record
for a tariff which would "protect legitimate business . "

The New York

Times described Hull as the le ader of the low tariff faction opposed
to the S mith-Raskob group .

Hull believed that "protection should be

12 4Rixley S mith and Norman Beasley, Carter Glass, A Biograph
y
( New York : Longmans , Green , and Co., 1939 ) , 2 82 .
12 5Hinton, op. cit., 185 .
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given where it was economically vital and that adjustments should b e made
in the most careful, gradual, and sc ientif ic manner.1 1 126

Hull addres sed the House on January 3, 1929, concerning the Ameri

can tariff and the nation's trade policies. He blamed the United States
tariff policy for the unfortunate creation of a network of high tariffs

and other trade barriers in Europe following the war. He declared its

results had been les s production, inefficient use of cap ital, uneconomic

location of indus tries, detrimental trade controvers ies, and disastrous

handicaps to the reestablis hment of international trade. He, too, in

s isted that the United States should have formed in 1921 an " impartial

and fact-finding" tariff committee free from the "bias and factionali sm"

127
·
. 1 appointe
· ions.
.
d tari. ff commiss
of pres i'dentia

Hull opposed passage of the Hawley-Smoot Tariff, which was reluc
128
The Pres ident,
tantly s igned by Pres ident Hoover on June 17, 1930.
following his inauguration and having taken notice of the American

farmers' frightful conditions, had asked Congress in April of 1929 to
. 1tura 1 tari. ff. 129 Congress, as s iste
.
.
d by encouragement
the agricu
raise
from manufacturers ' interests and "lobbyists representing every con

ceivable economic group, " prepared a substantially higher tariff bill. 130
12 6New � !.!!!!!! , December 31, 1928.

127!lli · , 70 Cong . , 2 sees . , 1072- 1073.

128Hicks, � !! · , �· ill · , 540. The bi l l was not what Hoover
wished , but neither did he accept the advice from one thousand American
economists in the form of a petition urging a pres idential veto . I bid .
1 29Freidel, � ·

.£!! · ,

282-283 .

130carman, � al. , � · cit., 480-481.
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I n its final form, the Hawl ey-Smoot Tariff containe d 7 5 increases on
farm products and 92 5 on manufactured goods. The newly e nacted tariff
raised the average ad valorem duty from the 26 per cent under the Ford

ney-McCumber Act to an al l-time high of 5 0 per cent.131 The general

l eve l of protection was increase d approximate l y 7 per cent. During the
passage of the bil l , protests were re gistered by over one thousand
American economists and by trade associations in most of the European
countries. 132

Shortl y before the introduction of the Hawl ey-Smoot Bil l , Hul l ,
in a statement printed in the Congressional Record, cal l ed attention. to
the e fforts of the Republ ican Party to enact an upward revision of the
tariff.

He cl e verl y decl ared:

When I was a boy we were never able to take the same victim
on a sniping e xpedition more than once. The Repub l icans have
been able to carry many of the pol itical l e aders of American
agricul ture on a tariff sniping expedition, first in 192 1,
second in 192 2 , and now the y woul d try it a third time , in face
of the fact that ninety per cent of our farm acreage produces
surpl uses, the price of which abroad fixes home prices, and so
littl e or no tariff bene fits are afforded. 133
Representative Willis C . Hawley of Oregon, Chairman of the House
Ways and Means Committee , on May 7, 1929, introduced the original tariff
bill, which lay within the limitations outlined by President Hoover.

The

original bill was a basis for Republican, along with Democrat advocates
of tariff protection, to attach additional protective measures. 134
131Freide l , op. cit., 2 83-2 84.

132 Hicks, e t al., op . cit . , 539- 540.
1331 bid., 51- 52 .
134liicks, et al . ' op. cit., 539.
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May 11 Hull submitted a minority report signed only by himself, due to
the diversity of thought within his own party . 135

The minority report

was typical of Hull's tariff speeches before Congress.

The New York

Times labeled the report a rebuttal to Smith's belief that the tariff
issue could be taken out of politics.

Hull contended that the tariff

should never be dropped from politics as long as there was a "continuous
and corrupt political partnership between tariff beneficiaries and domi
nant Republican leadership. "

The report, too, dated only five months

before the great crash in September, 19 29, stated that America's pro

ductive capacity was 25 per cent greater than her ability to consume.

Thus, Hull observed that the solution of unemployment was the develop136
.
markets.
ment o£ foreign
The following day , Hull delivered on the floor of the House of

Representatives an address , which was the "most exhaustive tariff speech

of his career. " 137

The speech covered nearly twelve pages in the Con-

gressional Record. 138

The veteran Congressman directed a steady stream

of charges, backed with abundance of statistical information, upon
those who supported protection.

He criticized the high rates of Ameri

can tariff system as compared to those of other countries. He observed
135Hull, £f · £it., I , 132- 133 .
136
New !2!! Times, May 12 , 19 29 .

137 1 bid.
138cong.

g.!.£ . ,

7 1 Cong. , 1 sess. , 1201- 1212 .
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that our nation ' s tariff rates were topped by only one other c ountry,
Spain .

Hull noted that the United States took the lead in upward tariff

revision in . 192 2 and carried most of the other countries along with it
in forming "extraordinary high-tariff structures . 11 139

Continuing in the same speech, and in reference to the inequa l ity

between agriculture and industry, Hull described the splendid historical

role played by those of rural background. He declared:

When I recall that the highest and the finest types of our
civilization in all the centuries past originated among rural
people, t�at the cities have never been able to preserve and
maintain those high types in a permanent way, but they . have
always found their last retreat back among that sturdy yeomanry
that reside in the rural sections- -when I contemplate this situ
ation I naturally fall in w ith Thomas Jefferson's ideas that we
should so conduct our national policies as to maintain an equi
librium between agriculture and industry in this country
[applause] ; that we should not allow one to submerge the other ;
that we should keep them on a balance just as we keep our three
departments of government on a balance ; that this more nearly
· than all other polic ies is calculated to guarantee the permanency
of a free republic . [App lause :J 140

As Hull continued to speak before Congress on the pr inc iples in

which he believed so strongly, he also continued to reach only closed
ears. In his Memoirs he reviewed that disquieting period:

The year 1929 was perhaps the nadir of my Congressional
career. We had lost the national elections ; I was disturbed
by those Democrats who had swung toward high-tariff ide as ; my
fight of two decades to reduce tariffs was failing to keep
them at their exist ing level, because a new movement to boost
them still higher was successfully under way in Congress, re
sulting in the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1 9 30 ; and my health was not
too good , 1 4 1
1 39

,,
1 40
.,
!lli
!lli

141

1 205 .

2 sees . ,

Hull , 2,2 •

.£!!· ,

1 203 .

I,

1 32 .
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Hull, understandably, became depressed and contemplated return

ing home to Carthage to practice law. 1 4 2

Then in late August of

1 929

Senator Lawrence D. Tyson of Tennessee died, and Governor Henry H.

Horton appointed William E . Brock of Chattanooga to fill the vacancy.
Brock filled Tyson's seat until November, 1 930, when he stood for elec

tion to the short term, the lame duck Congress beginning in December,
1 930,

and lasting until March 4, 1 93 1 .

March

4,

Also, in November,

1 930,

an

election was held for the Senate term of the full six years starting
193 1 .

Therefore, Hull was confronted with the choices of

running for either the short term, the long term, or both terms � 1 4 3

Hull was not interested in serving in the lame duck session of

Congress, but at the same time he was fearful that if Brock were elected

to the short term, he might likewise succeed as a candidate for the full
term. 1 44

Finally, after careful consideration, and with his doctor ' s

approval concerning his questionable health, 14 5 on September 2,

1 929,

Hull announced his candidacy for the six-year t rm beginning March 4,
,
1 93 1 . In the meantime, Tennessee Democratic supporters of Brock real
ized that Hul l ' s candidacy woul d be too strong for Brock to encounter ,

and favored his running only for the short term session.

This action

was taken even though it was widely held, in accordance with Tennessee's
strictly observed geographical distribution of senators, that since
14 2Hinton, op. cit. , 1 9 3 .
1 4 3Hull,££· cit. , I , 1 34 .
1 44

ainton,££· cit. , I, 193 .

14 5Hull, �- cit. , I, 1 34.
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Tyson had been from Knoxville, his successor must also come from East
Thus, Brock from Chattanooga, the western boundary of the

Tennessee .

eastern part of the state, was considered a logical choice .

At that

time, Senator Kenneth D . McKellar of Memphis represented the western
portion of the state .

It was believed by many that the election of Hull

from upper-Middle Tennessee would result in undue weight to the western

section of the state . 146

The political machine of the former United States Senator Luke

Lea was hastily reorganized .

Lea, in 1915, due to his attempt to con.

trol state politics, had been temporarily quieted by Huli . 147

In

Memphis was the political boss, Ed Crump, who at that time cooperated
with Lea.

The group led by Lea and Crump put up A . L . Todd, who was

Hull's major opposition.

Hull based his campaign for the Senate on his

numerous years of service in the House, and on the support of personal

friends and "Democrats more interested in the welfare of the Party and

country than in any faction or individual . "

In addition, he anticipated

and received strong backing from the "national soldiers, farm, labor,

and rural carrier and postal organizations . 11 148

The campaign dealt mostly with domestic issues and personal

accusations.

Todd greatly stressed the fact that Hull's automobile

carried a District of Columbia license rather than a Tennessee one , and
14 6Hinton, £2 ·

.£!!· ,

194 .

14 7s ee page 29 for discussion of Hull and Lea ' s political fight
in 1915 .
148Hull,

,2R •

ill • ,

I , 135 .

that he used a driver from Washington .

Tennessee license and driver.
on the subject of democracy.
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Hull was quick to secure both a

His theme during the campaign was based

He won in the Democratic primary by a

"substantial majority, 11 149 defeating Todd by 61, 000 votes. 150 The New

York Times, in a complimentary editorial on Hull, stated that his elec

tion would do much "to raise the Senate level of industry, intelligence ,
and gentility. "

At the same time, the paper, in a derogatpry reference

to Senator McKellar, declared it would be praiseworthy of Tennessee to
"give Mr. Hull an equally high-grade colleague. 11 15 1

In the general

election of November, 1930, as expected, Hull soundly defeated the Re
publican candidate, Paul E . Divine of Johnson City , 152
153
increased to more than 100, 000 votes.

Hull's majority

Following the general election, Todd became dissatisfied with the

outcome of the primary election.

He, therefore, demanded and received a

United States Senate investigation of the expenditures made in that cam

paign .

Todd questioned the legality of certain campaign expenditures

made by Hull. The investigation was conducted by Senators Gerald P.
Nye of North Dakota and Robert F. Wagner of New York.

Hull presented
a detailed list of expenditures to the Senate committee, 154 claiming he
149Knoxville News-Sentinel, August

1 50Hull,

£2 •

151Hinton,

ill • ,

I , 138 .

£2 · cit . , 195 .

8,

1930 , I - 1.

152 Knoxvill e News-Sentinel ,
November 5, 1930 , I - 1.
153Hu 11 , _2E • cit • , I , 13 9 •
1541 bid.
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had spent $ 10, 000 ; 155 whereas, Todd refused either to testify or to submit a report .

The committee ruled in favor of Huli.

156

As a Senator-elect, Hull rarely spoke on the floor of the House

during the remaining session of his elected term to the Seventy-first

Con gress . 15 7 Nevertheless , Hull's views on the prevailing depression
and the tariff issue were presented before Congress.

On February 16,

1931, a statement by Hull entitled "Economic Policies of the Government"

.
. the Congressiona
.
1 Record.
was inserted
in

158

"Economic problems, including tariff and commercial policy," Hull

declared, "·would come first on any Democratic National Party program
during the next two years." 15 9

He condemned the Republican Party, under

the influence of strong business forces, for once again allowing the

nation's economy to reach panic conditions. He observed that immediately
after the close of the recent war, the United States raised its protec

tive tariff walls, and in due course other nations throughout the world
followed suit.

Therefore, Hull felt that the increased tariff barriers

had predominantly caused the "present world economic collapse. 11 160 He

also noted the very slight increase of world trade of 1929 over 1 9 13 for

both exports of the United States and other nations of the world .
155Hinton, � · cit., 194 .

156Hull, � · cit., I , 139 .

15 7cong . �- , 71 Cong., 3 sess., Index, 150.
1581 bid . , 5045.

l60i bid .

159I bid .

Hull
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then pointed out the substantial prewar amount of increase the United

. administration.
161
.
.
.· .
States had annua 11 y experience
.
d during
a Democratic
Thus Hull completed his career in the House of Representatives

with the tariff issue very much alive.

During the twenties, he strength

ened his views concerning economic cooperation with other countries by

his support of a conference of nations to be called by the United States.
He again proved his financial leadership by his actions as a dedicated

dissenter from Republican fiscal policies, and became associated in the

upper circles of the Democratic party as its chairman and contender for

the presidency.

Most important, he was one of the nation's most formid

able opponents of the protective tariff. The Senator-elect was prepared

for combat in the upper house .

1 61 I bid .

CHA.PI ER V
SENATORIAL CAREER
On December 7, 1931, Corde l l Hul l was administered the oath of

office as a newly elected United States Senator. 1 A week later he was

chosen to serve on the Senate Banking and Currency and the Finance com

mittees . 2 His tenure in the Senate lasted only the duration of the

Seventy-second Congress, for in January, 1933, he was asked by President

e lect Roosevelt to become Se.cretary of State. During his short period of
service in the Senate he continued to advance the same outspoken views

on the government ' s fiscal po licies that he had repeatedly presented in ·
the House, incl uding his advocacy of a lower tariff.

As he had done

during his last years as a representative, he gave his opinions free ly
as to what shoul d be done to combat the economic depression .

These views

were not always in accord with those advanced by President Hoover .

The President believed the depression was world-wide and that it

was de laying America ' s recovery.

Thus, in June, 192 1, he advocated a

moratorium on intergovernmental debts .

However, the proposal, which

was accepted by fifteen governments, was too late, as the German and

Austrian economies had failed .

Thus, the United State s soon fe lt the

effects of the European disaster and saw that more urgent legisl ation
1

Cong . � . , 7 2 Cong . , 1 sess . , 5.
2
I bid . , 439-440 .
1 06

10 7
was required. In January, 1932,. the Reconstruction F i nance Corporation

was formed and provided with $ 2,000,000,000 to lend to banks, railroads,

and mortgage companies near bankruptcy.

The Federal Land Banks were

created and allowed $ 12 5,000,000 to maintain farm mortgages.

tax was raised.

The income

To prevent foreclosure of individually owned homes, the

Federal Home Loan Bank Act was passed in July, 1932.

3

During the Hoover

Administration, over $ 2, 2 25,000, 000 was spent for public works.4 Con

cerning specific bills which were enacted, Hull voted for the establ is h

ment of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Federal Land Bank

Act, but failed to vote on the Federal Home Loan Bank Act.

Senator Hull, on January 15, 1932, advocated a thoroughgoing re

vision of the nation ' s tax structure. He contended there had been ex

cessive increases of taxes- -federal, state, and local--from $ 7,500,000,000

in 192 2 to $9, 700,000,000 in 1929, and there was urgent need for reforms

in all government operations.

He declared :

We see today a thoroughly confused, demoralized, and chaotic
tax situation, with most systems distinguished by discrimination,
excessive exemptions, exceptions, allowances, unscientific rates,
double, triplicate and quadruple taxation, and narrow and lop
sided methods, as the rule rather than the exception. 6

Rather strangely , on one point Hull wholeheartedly agreed with

Hoover's Secretary of the Treasury, Andrew Mellon, who stated, ''We have
3Carman , !! .!.! · , �· .£!! · , 508 .

4ilicks ,

!! !!.· , �· .£!! · ,

546 .

5con . � - , 72 Cong. , 1 s e s s . , 1705 ; 1879 ; 15604 .
g

6

!,lli .

, 2017 .
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at the present time an internal-revenue system of few and relatively

light taxes."

Hull contended that this system of limited taxation was

the major drawback in the treasury's futile effort to deal with the ever. " t. 7
.
de f ici
surmounting

He observed that the treasury of the United States

was facing an economic crisis virtually comparable to the seriousness of

wartime conditions. Therefore, he was of the opinion that those capable
of paying taxes "should cheerfully step forward and assume again, as

they did in World War I , surtax, gift, and estate tax boosts up to 40 per
cent . "8

Before the Senate on February 8, 1932, Hull outlined the following

program of tax cooperation for federal, state, and local governments:
1 . Present expenditures--federal, state, and local--of
$ 12, 000, 000, 000 should, by the most ruthless economies, be
reduced, during the next two years in an aggregate amount
running into the billions .

2 . Federal, state, and local taxes of $ 10 , 000 , 000 resting
as one common burden on the 123, 000, 000 American people should ,
at all hazards, be reformed, made more equitable, and reduced
20 to 35 per cent as speedily as may be legislatively possible .

3. Federal, state, and local indebtedness of $32, 000 , 000, 000
was in numerous inst ances incurred unwisely, unsoundly, and reck
lessly, with no sinking-fund provisions, subject to excessive
interest, with the calamitous result that the credit of most
branches of the government in America is seriously impaired.
The policy of steady payment of the public indebtedness inaugu
rated by Thomas Jefferson should be maint a ined . No government
can justify chronic borrowing to pay current demand, or tole rate
with complacency a gaping deficit until it reaches a rate of near
$3, 000, 000, 000 per annum, while sinking-fund policies are in
effect suspended . 9
7I bid .

9
� . , 351 2 .

109
On May 23, 1932, Hull again called the Senate ' s attention to his
desire for coordination of federal, state, and local taxation .

The ad

dress was ma de . during the dinner hour when many of the senators were not

in attendance .

His position in reference to the deplorable state of

affairs was that the nation's c apital should lead other forms of govern
ment by becoming the first to overhaul its inefficient means of opera
tion .

He believed that "no living person except a very few expert

accountants know how to read the balance sheet of the Treasury Depart

ment, 1 1 10 which he claimed represented nothing more than mass confusion
with all its endless types of appropriations "j umbled" together .

He

recalled that his views for many years had been that a system of modern
accounting in the Treasury Department should be adopted in order that
any citizen of America, at a quick glance at the balance sheet, could
readily ascertain both normal and extraordinary expenditures and re.

ce1.pts. 1 1
During the same speech Hull called attention to the amount of
various properties exempt from federal, state, and local taxation, and
comp l ained that it was the wea l thy who were protected from the payment
of their fair share of taxes.

He noted that $60, 000, 000, 000 of property

in the United States was tax-free, of which $34, 000, 000, 000 were tax
free federal, state, county , and municipal bonds.

On the other hand,

he stated that during a Democratic administration and Congress, in 1918,
$12, 000, 000, 000 of long-term bonds of the federal government were and
10 I bid. , 10940.

1 10

continued to be subjected to the surtax as enacted in that year .

While

observing that a small number of Americans own the greater part of the

$ 60, 000, 000, 000 of tax-free wealth, he declared that he would "consist

ently oppose" any legislation that would allow the wealthy to avoid tax

ation.

He denied that he was "a baiter of wealth, " for he only believed

burden.

He could not condone, especially in the state of emergency, a

that each class of citizenry should pay its fair portion of the tax

limited number owning the majority of the wealth of the nation free from

taxation, and asking that the rest of the country "defend and protect

it. " 12

Continuing, Hull condemned the Republic administration for its

handling of fiscal policies since 1929.

He indicated that the Treasury

allowed hundreds of millions of dollars of possible tax revenue to be
lost from the exceptionally high profits of 1929.

"Instead, " Hull

pointed out, " just the opposite course was pursued . " A resolution was

passed by Congress lowering rather than raising taxes .

The objective,

Hull noted, was to alleviate the panic condition by reducing the income
taxes $ 160, 000 , 000, but the panic picked up momentum, becoming more

alarming by the day, and the treasury continued to be drained, and still

that department appeared not to comprehend the seriousness of the �urrent
or future extent of the economic crisis. The result was a deficit of
$206 , 000, 000 for the fiscal year 1931 ; and instead of a surplus of

$30 , 000 , 000, as predicted by the Treasury Department for 1933 , the latest
12 I bid .
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available estimates showed a deficit ranging from $2, 750, 000, 000 to

$3, 000, 000, 000 . 1 3

Regarding the tariff issue, on January 4,

1 932,

only a few weeks

after Hull became a senator, the New York Times gave added weight to
Hull's tariff position.

The highly regarded newspaper, in an editorial,

backed Hull's continuous pleas for a world economic conference dedicated

to the gradual adjustment of existing tariffs. The editorial stated

that most of the world had intentionally armed itself to obstruct inter

national trade when trade was most needed.

In view of the fact that the

world-wide depression was in its third year, even an "unsuccessful con

ference on tariff" would be beneficial .

Such a conference would at least

inform people throughout the world as to the "full extent of the impedi

ments that have been placed in the way of international recovery by the
shortsighted policy of nations intent on 'protecting' their own in

terest . " 1 4

On February 8,

1 932,

Hull took up the attack in the Senate on the

tariff issue from where he had closed his remarks in the House. The

address, typical of his later tariff speeches given in the House, was

largely an outline of the development of the tariff structure since 1920,

with his customary indictment of the political party which he believed
most responsible for its enactment. He insisted that the self-seeking

and excessive policy of economic nationalism which had characterized the
13

14

1 bid . ,

1 0938- 1 0939.
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.

112

world since 1920 was largely due to America ' s leadership in the direc.
. .ion . 15
tive
of upward tari. ff revis

Hull noted that following the enact-

ment of the Hawley-Smoot Act of June, 1930, which called for 890 in

creases as opposed to only 235 decreases, a total of 25 countries raised
. tarif
. f rates. 16 He bluntly labeled their policy of protective
their

tariff barriers as the cause of the economically disastrous world condi
tions and the "gravest danger to world peace today. 1 1 17 Attacking the

Hoover administration , he denounced it for not having plans or program s

for the solution of the countles s and seemingly enduring economic diffi

culties . 18

Concerning the question of where the panic originated , Hull stated

that high-tariff minded America claimed that the panic was precipitated

in Europe , while Europe , with equal intensity , maintained that the panic
began in the United States.

He ins isted that it must be acknowledged

that the United States was the most prominent financial and economic

power among the nations of the world ; that its financial resources were

either not permanent or were unstable ; that its policy of nationalism had
been followed and praised s ince 1 9 30 ; and that the stock market crash in

New York had set off a shock wave felt by every organized financial

trading establishment throughout the world. 19

Rull asserted that Old

Guard Republicans were pinpointing the blame for the panic as far away
1 5 Cong. !!..£ · , 72 Cong. , 1 see s . , 3505.

1 61 bid. , 35 09.
18 t bid . , 3507 .

17

!,lli .
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from the United States as possible .

From the numerous contradictory

statements of Republican spokesmen, he said, "one might plausibly con

clude that the panic originated in the great Arabian desert, or some

where near the middle of the I ndian Ocean, but that in any event the
Republican administration had nothing remotely to do with it . 1 120

Continuing, and in reference to England's going off the gold

standard in September, 1931, 2 1 Hull thought that the United States was

"incapable of administering the gold standard . "

He also insisted that

the United States could not provide the leadership for an effective and

suitable distribution of gold and an acceptable plan of monetary stabil

ization for the various countries of the world.

He contended that nations

hiding behind a protective tariff wall, backed by substantial credits,

had no right to monopolize the world's supply of gold for their own mer

cenary needs.

Hull, too, believed that the United States was not "quali

fied by the necessary information , experience, and financial machinery"

to fulfill the role, recently relinquished by England, as financ ial and
commercial center of the world.

Interesting, in view of his subsequent

career, was Hull's conclusion that international cooperation was the

best possible method of lowering the tariff walls and reestabl is hing a

sound international credit structure . 2 2

To promote international coop

eration for those goals, Hull believed the American government could do
its part by enacting leg islation authorizing the President to call a
2 0� . , 3504 .
21

� · , Index , 771 .
22
� . , 3 505 ; 3 673 .

1 14

world economic confe rence , allowing the President to negotiate t rade
agreements "based upon mutual tariff concessions and the unconditional
most-favored nation doctrine, " and the erection of an "impartial fact
finding commission" for the cautious downward revision of the e xisting

tariff structure. 23

Following the speech, Senator Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas,.
De mocratic floor leader, declared the address reflected "profound
thought . "

Senator Robinson believed Hull ' s speech embodied "sound prin

ciples of government and should receive general consideration . "24

The basis of Hull ' s goal for lowering the tariff structure was
embodied in a proposed bill calling for passage of an amendment to the
Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act of 1930. On March 2 4 , 1932, before the Senate,
Hull supported the passage of this bill.

Much of the speech was devoted

to criticism of President Hoover for his re luctance to take decisive
action in dealing with the deplorable economic conditions. Recalling
that the panic had begun in October, 1929, Hull observed that the Hoover
administration was still making use of only temporary emergency re lief
measures and was holding the United States to an outmoded policy of eco-

. . l . .
nomic
iso ationism. 25

He firmly voiced his opinion that the "mad pur-

suit of economic nationalism or aloofness or seclusion- -every nation

striving to live unto itself--has proved utterly e mpty and disastrous. 26

23I bid . , 351 1.

2 5 � . , 6787- 6788 ,
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The bill was passed by both houses of Congress , vetoed by Presi

dent Hoover , and later the lower house sustained the President's veto.2 7

President Hoover stated in his veto message that the United States, at
this time more than ever in its history, needed the benefits of tariff

protection. I f the purpose of the bill was to reduce tariff rates by 35

per cent on those imports not on the free list, the President observed,

then the simple remedy was for Congress to specify only those items need
ing reduction and enact legislation accordingly .

The President opposed

the part of the bill calling for the withdrawal of presidential authority
to adopt or reject rate changes recommended by the bipartisan Tariff

Commission.

Hoover felt this elimination would reduce the Tariff Commis

sion to no more than an advisory group, in that the proposal would re-

strict the commission's ability, subject to the President ' s approval, to
change the tariff rates up to 50 per cent .

He expressed the effective- ·

ness of the flexible provisions as used by the Tariff Commission in ite
recommendations to him.28

The President also found fault with the proposal calling for an

international conference whose purpose would be the lowering of existing

tariffs.

Hoover declared he did not want to submit what he considered

a domestic question to an international conference. Concerning the sec

tion authorizing the President to "negotiate with foreign governments
2 71 bid., Index , 888.

281 bid.,
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reciprocal trade agreements under a policy of mutual tariff concessions,"

Hoover felt this portion of the bill was in direct contradiction to

other sections seeking "to eliminate discriminating tariffs ; or prevent

economic wars ; or promote fair, equal, and friendly trade . " He indi-

. cated that the American government in the past had acted upon a well
proven policy of like treatment for all nations of the world .

President

Hoover reasoned that the reciprocal arrangements with one country to the
exclusion of other countries meant the renouncement of the rule of equi

table treatment.

Thus, he concluded that the desertion of fair treat

ment for all nations would be the "very breeding ground for trade wars. " 29
On May 19, 1932, Hull delivered his reply to President Hoover's

veto message.

He stated that the President inferred that the existing

tariff duties on only

35

per cent of imports, allowed ample imports, and

that the nation's best protection was the continuance of a duty on at
least 35 per cent of imported goods .

Hull maintained that the 35 per

cent figure was actually much larger than "meets the eye. " The truth

was that the United States did import a vast number of raw materials duty
free, but placed a prohibit ive tariff levy on any commodity "even re

motely or speculatively competitive . "30

Hull rebuffed Hoover ' s desire for the continuance of the exist

ing relationship between the Tariff Commission and the Chief Execut ive.

He strongly believed that since the commission was named by the President
29 1 bid .

301 bid. , 10637.
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and was also under the direction and control of the President, who was
sympathetic with those who ga ined from tariff protection, the organiza
tion should be abolished .

Hull asserted that he therefore favored a

bill abolishing what was in effect a partisan commission and repealing
the flexibl e provisions of the law whic� had served to increase rather
than decrease protection.

As a replacement, he advocated the establish

ment of an impartial fact-finding board and the reinstatement of the

authority of Congress to legisl ate tariff rates in their entirety . 31
Continuing, Hull sa id he was- perplexed to learn that President

Hoover did not favor an international conference on economic conditions
or the proposal for reciprocal trade agreements based on mutual ta� iff
concessions .

Concern1ng the international conference, Hull told Con

gress that three months of extensive preparation had been made in e eek
ing a satisfactory solution to the intricate domestic and international
conditions .

He stated that those who took part in the preparation and

approved the international conference represented the most distinguished
and unbiased economic experts in every important country . 32 As to the

section for reciproca l commercia l agreements based on mutual tariff con
cessions , Hull expla ined that the President, without suf f icient know
ledge , assumed that the bill proposed reciprocal trade treaties "based

on the conditional instead of the unconditional f a vored-nation doctrine. 33

The actua l truth , Hull pointed out, was that the bill did not mention the
32 I bid.
31� - , l 638 .
O
33Por a description of "most- f avored nation clause , " see footnotes
58 and 59 of Chapter III .
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matter either way .

He asserted that Congress, anticipating a contro

versy, agreed to allow the President to stee r his own course of action
as to whe ther to negotiate on the conditional or the unconditional
favored-nation clause.

Hull also stated that Congress took for granted,

based upon the present policy, that the executive department would

negotiate on the unconditional form of the favored-nation doctrine . 34
Hull continued his attack on the current tariff law on April 8,
1932, in an address before the Senate . The upper house was in debate
over a resolution of Senator David A. Ree d, a Republican of Pennsyl
vania .

In view of England having abandoned the gold standard, 35 the

resolution called for an investigation of the "effect of the deprecia
tion of foreign currency values upon importations of important commodi
ties into the United States. "

Later, the resolution was passed .

Hull

believed Senator Reed' s resolution was a hidden attempt by protection
ists to once again raise the tariff rate.

Both Senators Ree d and James

J . Davis , also of Pennsylvania, quizzed the Senator from Tennessee ,
asking why both cotton and coal a s well as other imports should not be
curtail ed to protect domestic employment . The two senators from Pennsyl 
vania called Hull's attention to the recent increase in compe tition of
cotton and coal from abroad.

Hull admitted that a number of cotton and

coal workers were affected by imports, but carefully observed that our
exports of those two commodities far e xcee ded our imports. Thus, Hull
341b id., 10639 .

351bid. , Index, 7 7 1 .
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reasoned that America's exports of cotton and coal, as well as many other

goods, provided far more jobs than were comparatively lost due to im

ports. With the assistance of Senator Edwa�d P. Costigan of Colorado,
he also argued there was no need to become alarmed and enact higher

tariff walls because the English nation had gone off the gold standard.

Hull pointed out that following England's dropping of the gold standard ,
her exports to the United States had gradually lessened.36

During the same speech Hull also brought to the nation's atten�

tion the abnormal amount of surpluses of goods being produced by the
leading countries of the world .

He asserted that 20, 000, 000 people

throughout the world would find their conditions worsened instead of
lightened if a sound economic policy based largely on a lower tariff

were not adopted by the great creditor and surplus-producing nations.

He called upon the United States to do her part to alleviate the situa
tion. He also presented statistics conc�rning American exports and im
ports, showi�g the vast decline in world trade of a leading creditor

and surplus-producing country. Hull noted that in January, 1927, the
United States exported $419, 000, 000 ; whereas, in January, 1932, the

figure was $ 150, 000, 000. Concerning imports, he observed that in January,
1927, the American government received $356, 000, 000 worth of goods from

abroad ; whereas, in the corresponding month of 1932, the figure stood at
only $ 136, 000, 000 . 37

36� . , 7736-7744 .
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During Cordell Hull' s senatorial career, he became a leading
backer of Governor Franklin D . Roosevelt' s bid for the Democratic presi-

.
. . 38
. l nomination
dentia

Significantly, Hull himself was still considered

by many as a possible presidential candidate .

Following Hull' s election

to the Senate, the Review of Reviews sununarized his qualifications in
an article on potential presidential candidates .

The magazine presented

the Tennessee Senator as an authority on tariff matters, "an uncompro
mising foe of high protection, " an advocate of international coopera
tion, and as a leader of "calm j udgment and cautious movement . "

This ·

periodical pointed out also that although bankers and manufacturers might
oppose the lowering of tariffs and at the same time for personal reasons
support international cooperation, Hull' s support of such policies was
based upon his firm belief that they would "safeguard the interest of
the conunon run of men . " Thus, the Tennesseean' s convictions identified
him with a large segment of the voting population . 39

He, too, was men

tioned by Colonel House in a conversation with James A . Farley, Chair
man of the New York S tate Democratic Committee, as his choice for the
presidency in the event Roosevelt lost the nomination .

Colonel House

also referred to Hull as an "ideal candidate" for Roosevelt's vice
presidential running mate . 40

I n his book, Behind the Ball ots, Farley

38James A . Farley, Behind the Ballots (2 vols. , New York :
court, Bratt and Co. , 1938), I, 101 .

Har

39 Emily Newell Blair, "Opportunity Rouses the Democrats," The
American Review of Reviews, LXXXII (December, 1930) , 59 -61 .
4°Farley, � - cit . , I , 100 .
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described Hull in the following manner :
I came to know him intimate ly as a result of my f requent trips
to Washington during the preconvention period . He was devoted
and untiring in his labors, and the advice he gave was nearly
always correct . I conferred with him alone on many occasions,
and he sat in on a number of general conference s . I t has been
my experience that when men sit up close around the table in
political discussion, especially when stakes are high, a good
glimpse of their real character is almost always possible . Am
bition is pretty heady stuff, and it is frequently difficult for
an individual to overlook his own personal interests for the sake
of the cause he is serving . I don't intend that as a general
criticism , or intimate that I am any diffe rent in that respect
from other men . Howe ver, in a lif e devoted to politics, it is
natural for a man to size up those with whom he is in constant
contact, and with whom he must deal . I formed the opinion early
that Cordell Hull was the most unselfish man I had e ver me t in
politics, and nothing has happened since to cause me to change
that opinion. Holding such an opinion, it was e asy for me to
agree with Colonel House that he was capable of filling any posi
tion of honor, including the Presidency, with distinction. 4 1
I n the fall of 1931, Senator-elect Hull, along with Senators
Burton K . Wheeler of Montana and Clarence C. Dill of Washington, became

the nucleus of Roosevelt ' s earliest senatorial supporters . 42

Soon ,

Senator Alben W . Barkley of Kentuck y was added to the group .

Later,

Barkley, writing in That Reminds Me, referred to Hull as the charter

member of the small group of senators . 43

Hull and Roosevelt began their relationship during the Wilson
Administration when Roosevelt was Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Al
though e ach person ' s official position required no direct contact, the
two became acquainted at various governmental functions . 44
41I bid. , 101-102 .

42 I bid. , 89.

The rela-

43Alben W. Barkley , That Reminds Me (Garden City , New York :
Doubleday and Comp any , I nc . :-T§43) , 140.
44Hull ,

£E·

cit. , I , 94 .
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Hull's differences with the Democratic Party as led by Alfred E . Smith .
Even though Hull supported ( but halfheartedly) the Democratic ticket

in 1928, as has been previously described, he did not support Smith's
views calling for tariff protection.

In April, 1929, as on other occa

sions, Hull issued a statement aimed at the party's titular spokesman .

He bitterly condemned those "Democrats who are undertaking to effect

arrangements for the unconditional surrender of the Democratic Party

to the forces of high-tariff greed and privilege . " Thereafter , Hull's

conferences with Roosevelt increased, as the two found mutual agree

ment on the tariff issue and economic policies.

In his conversations

with Roosevelt, Hull clearly made it known his opposition to Smith and

to John J. Raskob, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, who

held similar views. Significantly, due to Roosevelt's continued associ
ation with Smith , Hull never discussed his plans with Roosevelt for

challenging the Smith-Raskob faction . 45

The showdown came in early 1931 in a national committee meeting

called together by the Smith-Raskob faction.

The purpose of the meeting

was that the national committee might declare publicly the entire party's

position on various issues, particularly prohibition.

Smith and Raskob ' s

group was determined that the committee adopt .a resolution requesting

repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment as part of the 1932 platfom. Hull

strongly objected to a few men expressing the views of all members of
451 bid. , 130-132 , 141.
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the party .

O n March 2 , 1931, the New York Times reported that his oppo

sition to repeal of prohibition was "conclusive assertion" of the same

view expressed by other Southern Democrats .

Concerning the national

committee's views on prevailing issues , the paper stated that Hull "re
inforced opinions" stated by Senators Robinson, Glass , and Cameron

Morrison of North Carolina. 46

Three days before the meeting , three national committee members-�

Hull, Governor Harry F. Byrd of Virginia, and Senator John S. Cohen of

Georgia--and two senators--Robinson and Claude A. Swanson of Virginia-

met together and planned the opposition's defense . 47 The group felt it

would be most detrimental to the party to allow prohibition to carry

more weight as an issue than the economic situation.48 Hull was especi
ally fearful that the party would be once again committed to a high

tariff.

Concerning prohibition, he believed the que stion should be de

termined by each state acting separately, and that it should not be made

a "national partisan issue . 11 49

The following night the Tennessee Sena

tor received a telephone call from Governor Roosevelt saying that he

was sending two national committee members from New York and his personal

representative , James F . Farley , to assist the group opposed to Smith

and Raskob. Hull was delighted, and knew then that undoubtedly "a
46New
� � ' March 2 , 1931.
47Hull, � · cit. , I , 94.

48Farley , �· cit . , I , 75.

49Hull , �· cit . , I , 140-141 .
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complete separation between the Smith and Roosevelt forces had
occurred . "S O

Farley related in his book that it was the first time

Smith and Roosevelt had been "arrayed on opposite sides of the same
question.1 1 5 1
The meeting was held on March 5 , 1931, and ended, much to Hull 's
satisfaction, by denying the national committee the right to e stablish
the party's position on i�sues, and by taking no action on a higher

tariff or on the prohibition question . 52

Both groups presented their

positions on the prohibition question, but Chairman Raskob re alized
that the opposition had a majority of votes to reject the proposal, and
failed to call for a vote . 53 The significance of the meeting was that

those opposed to prohibition or those who did not desire to make the
que stion a party issue "looked with favor or much less disfavor on
Governor Roosevelt."

Other possible Democratic presidential candidates

opposed to the group led by Smith and Raskob also received increased sup
port .

I n addition, Smith's influence in his own state of New York, as

a former governor, was greatl y weakened in the national committee .
According to Hul l , the meeting represented "the most important turning
point which ultimately resulted in the defeat of Smith and the nomination

of Franklin D . Roosevelt for President . 11 54

so� . ,
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On May 10, 1932 , less than two months before the Democratic Con
vention, Hull created a division of thought among Rooseve l t's backers
in the Senate . Tennessee's junior Senator bitte rly criticized Senator
Barkley ' s vote for a duty on coal in the revenue bill before the Senate
Finance Conunitte e. In attacking the Kentucky Senator, Hull referred to
Barkle y ' s vote as "monstrous," and declared that Democratic support of
a higher tariff was a " legislative and party sin. "

Barkle y at that time

was the le ading choice of the Roosevelt group, including Hull, as the
keynote speaker for the coming convention .

The New York Time s, while

describing Hull a. s the "leading Roosevelt champion in the Senate," felt
it would be most difficult for Barkle y at the convention to speak against
55
.
a protective
tar1" ff .

Interestingly, Barkle y, as the ke ynote speaker ,

strongly condemned the high tariffs successively enacted by the Republi

can administrations.56

Three days fol� owing Hull ' s attack on Barkley, the Tennessee Sena
tor , along with four other Democratic members of the Senate Finance
Committee, submitted a minority report on the revenue bill .

The report

was in retaliation to those Democratic senators of the same committee
who had voted for protection.

I n addition to Hull, others who signed the

minority report were Senators Pat Harrison, Walter George, David Walsh,
and Edward Costigan.

The group demanded the elimination of the duties

on coal , oil , copper , and al uminum .

5 5�

X2!! �'

Democrat ic members of the committee
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who did not sign the report were Senators Alben Barkley, Thomas Connally,

Thomas Gore, and William King. Senators Connally and Gore of Te xas and
Oklahoma, respectively, had voted for oil, and King from Utah had voted

for copper .

The report condemned their action as "log-rolling, " and

accused the senators of swapping votes with other senators to make cer

tain that a valuable item. from their section might be included on the

. t. 5 7
protected 1 1.s

Also during the spring of 1932, Hull accepted a request by A.

Mitchell Palmer, Wilson's Attorney General, to assist in preparing a
draft for the Democratic national platform .

The two worked jointly with

Daniel C. Roper, former Commissioner of Revenue; Congressmen Henry Rainey
of I llinois, and William Ayres of Kansas, and other Democrats. As the

date of the Democratic convention approached, the Tennessee Senator was

sought by both Roosevelt 5 8 a�d those associated with the movement to
become chairman of the Committee on Platform and Resolutions.

On Apr il

30, 1932, the New York Times published that Hull was not a "receptive

candidate for chairman." The Senator wished to remain free and "un

hampered" at the convention so that he might devote h imsel f fu l ly to the
framing of the economic sections of the party p latform.

Hull maintained,

too, that by being free, he would be in the best position to "challenge

the strong influence in the Democratic Party which have been seeking to
carry it into the Republican right wing on the tariff.11 59
5 7 I bid . , May 13, 1932 .

5 8.aull, 2-2· cit. , I , 150- 15 1.
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Hull explained to Roosevelt that by not having the responsibility of
chairmanship, he "could defend all provisions of the platform draft
against attack . 11 60

Even up to a few days before the convention began, Roosevelt con�

tinued to expect Hull to accept the position.

The Tennessee Senator

again declined, for the same reason, and recommended former Senator

Gilber M. Hitchcock of Nebraska .

Roosevelt accepted the suggestion,

and Hitchcock served as the convention ' s chairman of the Committee on

Platform and Resolutions. At the convention, Hull constantly defended

the platform. Although he lost on the prohibition question, for the
most part the other planks were well accepted by the committee .

His

economic and tariff planks were adopted by the committee and by the con

vention in their entirety .

tion:

In his Memoirs, he expressed his gratifica

The convention ' s adoption of the tariff and economic planks
delighted my heart. I was gratified to see the Party swing
back from the Sm ith-Raskob ideas to a fixed pol icy of sound
economics. The way was paved for the trade-agreements legis
lation in 1 934. 6 1

The future secretary of state was in wholeherted agreement con

cerning the foreign policy plank , which stated :

We advocate a firm foreign policy , including peace with all
the world and the settlement of international disputes by arbi 
trat ion ; no interference in the internal affairs of other nations ;
the sanctity of treaties and the maintenance of good faith and
good will in financial obligations ; adherence to the World Court
with appending reservations ; the Pact of Paris abolishing war as
60

Hull , �· cit. , I ,

61 I bid .
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an instrument of national pol icy, to be made effective by provi
s ions for consultation and conference in case of threatened vio
lations of treatie s . 62
On the issue of prohibition, Hull lost that battle. Upon his

arrival to the convention , he attempted to les sen the importance of the
question by acceptance of its submis s ion to the states for repeal, but

at the same time not making it part of the party platform .

wished to avoid mak ing prohibition a party issue .

Thus , Hull

He , too, strongly de

clared that " it would be a damnable outrage, bordering on treason, if

the convention should not primarily addre s s its elf to the economic condi
tion of the country . "63

On the other hand, the wets, led by Smith and backed by the larger

cities, were equally determined that the party take a stand on prohibi

tion .

The Committee on Re solutions adopted the plank which Hul l strongl y

opposed . 64 Before the convention ' s delegate s, in pre senting a minority

plank on prohibition, Hull pleaded for submis sion of the Eighteenth

Amendment to the state s "without making acceptance of repeal a test for
party loyalty . "

The Tenne s a ee Senator was booed by the wets and followed

by Smith on the speake rs ' p l atform .

Smith, amidst frequent outbursts of

cheers, excl aimed that there was "nothing the convention can do except

pos sibly extend sympathy . "

Hull was very embarras s ed .
62� .

The convention l aughed, 6 5 and without doubt

I n his Memoirs, he referred to the incident
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in the fol l owing manner :
Governor Smith followed me on the speakers' platform, and I
was not a little surprised to see him engage in both demagogy
and discourtesy at my e xpense. Possibly he was stimulated by
the wild shouts of the packed-to-order gallerie s . I had cited
his position on Prohibition four years before , which was the
same as I was now presenting. He indulged in a tirade against
me in order somewhat awkwardly to cloak the fact he had reversed
himself . No doubt he was also smarting under my four years '
constant, active opposition to his organization.66
Although Smith won that round, he lost the nomination to Roosevelt.
In November, 1932, the American voters overwhelmingly decided
that the future President and both houses of Congress would be Demo
Since the election was a foregone conclusion, Hull played only

cratic.

. 1 ro 1e.67
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On December 6, 1932, Hull issued a statement to the

press entitled "Panic Conditions, Problems , and Remedies, " in which he
promised that the Democratic Party would have a constructive program
satisfactorily evaluating the postwar economic conditions and that his
party woul d provi de for extra sess ions of Congress if the public so de
manded.

He repeated what he had often said before, that the "deep

seated and chronic" conditions, the effect of "blind, selfish, and dumb
economic le adership in this country since 1 920, " could not be solved
1.mme
.
d1.ate
"
1 y.
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Senators Costi gan and Hull, both members of the Senate Finance
Committee and personal friends, in January, 1933, worked together on a
6 6Hull, � · cit . , I , 15 2.

67Hinton, £2 · cit. , 201.
68

Cong. � . , 7 2 Cong. , 2 sess. , 65-66.
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resolution that Costigan introduced before the Senate .

The resolution ,

which was passed, called for the Tariff Commission to provide statis
tical information on imports and exports ·that wo uld be helpful to the in

coming administration in negotiating trade agreement s . 69 During the same
month , Hull accompanied the President-elect through the area which was

soon covered by the Tennessee Valley Authority .

Whil e s erving in the

House, Hull, along with other Tennesseeans , had safeguarded the state's
right to power lying within her political boundary.

Upon learning of the

Norris plan--a project to develop the area on a broad scale--the Tennessee
group abandoned the ir state- orient ated proposals and gave full support to

the new plan. 7 0

On January 19 or 2 0, 1933 , the President-elect asked Hull to be

come his Secretary of State . 7 1 According .to Hull , "I was really almost
thunderstruck . " Thinking a long career remaine d ahead of him in the
Senate, the Tenne ssee Senator insisted he had given no consideration to

such an appointment . 74 Alben Barkley, writing in That Remind s !:!!, men
tioned that Colonel House claimed the credit f or recommending .to Roose

ve 1t t hat Hul l be made the ne w Secretary of State .7 3

Hull requested and received from Roosevelt more time to think over
the many implications of the position. He clearly saw the vast oppor
tunities for the cause of international economic pe ace embodied within
69Hull ,

7 0i bid.

�f ·

cit . , I, 156 .

7 1Hinton , � · cit . , 2 08 .
7 2Hu l l , � · cit. , I, 156.
7 3 Ba rkley , � · cit . , 2 60 .
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the secretaryship. He also realized he could do more for his objective

of economic world peace as the head of the State Department rather than
as a mem�er of the Senate. 74 During this period of Hull's thinking ,

Roosevelt became more convinced that the Tennesseean was the ideal per

son for the appointment .

The President-elect reasoned that Hull's

acceptance would do m uch to hold Southern support, in view of t.he notice
able amount of Northern liberal element among his close associates.
On February 1 7, 1933 , Hull accepted Roosevelt's offer. 75

Before

Hull ' s acceptance , he impressed upon Roosevelt that he did not regard

the duties of the State Department as the mere routine of corresponding

with foreign goverrunents .

The Senator insisted that he expected to ad

vise the President "in every possible way in the formulation and conduct

of foreign policy . 1 1 76

Four days later , the President-elect officially

announced Hull's appointment . 77

In the meantime , before Roosevelt's public announcement, news

circulated that the appointment had been made.

Senator William E . Borah,

Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations , having been assured by
colleagues of the appointment , led congres sional praise ,

Borah �escribed

Hull as an "able , cultured gentleman, a deep student of international
74Hull, �· cit., I, 156- 1 5 7.

75Hinton, £2 · cit., 209- 210.
76
Hull, �· cit . , I, 158.
77Hinton, �· cit., 21 1 .
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affairs, and a man of courage. " The committee chairman considered Hull

the "first economist in Congress." 78

Harold Hinton, in his biography

on Hull, said his acceptance was looked upon with much favor in news. reaction.
79
. 1 s an d public
'
paper ed.itoria

On the other side, Senator Tom Connally, member and future chair

man of the Foreign Relations Conunittee, recorded a different impression
of Hull ' s appointment. Connally, who differed with Hull on numerous

occasions while the latter was Secretary of State, later wrote an account
of the Tennesseean ' s appointment in his autobiography, � � is Tom

Connally.

The Texas Senator bluntly stated that Hull lacked training

in foreign affairs, having never served on the House Conunittee on

Foreign Affairs or the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations .

Senator

Connally concluded that the appointment was merely a political repay

ment, as Hull had been one of Roosevelt's staunchest supporters in gain-

·
so
.
.
. .
. the nomination
ing
and winning
the election.
On March 3,

1 933,

Hull resigned his seat in the Senate8 1 and be

came Secretary of State the following day.

Thus, Hull entered the

Senate during the dark days of a raging depression and became Secretary
of State on a day when the nation ' s economy was at its lowest ebb.

During this interval , Hull forcibly advanced his views on fiscal measures
78New York Times, February

79Hinton, �· cit . , 21 1 .

80

1 9,

1933.

connally, �· cit., 20 1 .
81
Cong. Rec. , 72 Cong. , 2 sees., 5427.

and the tariff issue.

Evidence of his gains was the acceptance by the

Democratic Convention in 1932 of his economic and tariff planks and the
nomination of a President who likewise espoused his ideas.

The career of Cordell Hull as Secretary of State is familiar to

all students of history.

He served in this capacity longer than any

other American and endured twelve of the world's most crucial years.

During this years, his strong belief in low tariffs was put into effect

by the enactment of reciprocal trade agreements with many nations of the

world. Hull was widely noted for his work in the development of the

"Good Neighbor" policy of the Roosevelt Administration toward Latin

America. As World War I I came to an end, he tirelessly worked for a
future organization dedicated to world peace. When Hull resigned in

1944 due to ill health, President Roosevelt, reviewing the Secretary ' s

efforts for "international amity, 1182 dubbed Hull "The Father of the

United Nations. "83

In 1945, Hull was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize . 84

On July 23, 1955, Cordell Hull passed �way at Naval Medical

Center in Bethesda, Maryland .

In Geneva, President Dwight D. Eisenhowe r

interrupted the Big Four Conference to offer the nation ' s gratitude for

Hull ' s "long and fruitful labors in the cause of peace . "
82
� � .!.!!!!, , July 24, 1955 .
83icnoxville News-Sentinel, July 24, 1955.
841 bid .

85!!!! � � ' July 24, 1955.

85

In Hull ' s
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beloved native state, the Nashville Tennesseean expressed the feelings

of many Americans :

As much as any citizen of his time he symbolized the rugged
Americanism upon which our national strength has been built.
The Jacksonian spirit which sustained him to the end , strides
on and on across the globe. His words will resound throughout
the years , his example will sustain and encourage generations
as yet unborn.86

86Nashvil le Tennesseean , Ju ly 24 , 1 9 55 .

CHAPTER VI
AN EVALUATI ON OF HULL ' S CONGRESSI ONAL CAREER
Cordel l Hul l ' s some twenty congressional years , with two of those

years as chairman of his party , might be analyzed in d ifferent segments .
Each phase represents a maturing and more responsib le man .

As the

nation grew in· wealth , population , and prestige , Cordel l Hul l ' s stature

increased as representative, senator , and final l y as secretary of state .

He was never a person to shirk responsibility , and each added amount of

responsib il ity led him to new heights of service to his country .

Earl y in 1907, during the in itial period of Hul l ' s activity in

the House , he advocated a l ower tariff and the enactment of an income

tax law as a more effective means of raising revenue .

In his maiden

speech, he p leaded for a l ower tariff and an income tax.

During the

early part of the Wi lson administration , the nation's spotl ight was on
Hul l as author of our first successful income tax l aw .

During the war

years , the maturing Congressman was inva l uabl e for his fiscal advice to

Presiden� .W.iJ son.

Hul l real ized, as the war cl osed , the need for

cooperation among the nations of the world , and declared that economic
wars are b ut the beginning or "germs" of real wars .

The period of the twenties , with Repub l ican administrations and

congresses , marked Hul l's time as the dissenter ; nevertheless , he pro
gressed .

Fol l owing his election defeat in 1920, the Democratic National

Committee stil l thought enough of Hul l to make him its chairman.
135

He
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received national attention . as the party's spokesman, and constantl y re�
ceived coverage in the infl uential � � !.!:!!! •

During the twenties,

he was repeatedl y mentioned as an excel lent presidential candidate not
onl y by his home state, but by many others.

He regained his seat in the

House in 192 2 by a substantial margin, and became a leading minority

member of the House Ways and Means Cotµtnittee during the remainder of

his service in that b od y.

In the Senate, Hul l was also held in high

esteem, and was most notable besides his fiscal and tariff positions

as an ardent supporter of Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt as the future

President .

From this researcher ' s description throughout the paper and its

analysis, it would seem that Cordel l Hul l was a national figure before
he became secretary of state.

approach.

This writer is prone to take an opposite

From the sources read and ·evaluated concerning Hul l , it is

my contention that he was never ful l y known outside of Tennessee until
he became secretary of state.

This conviction is held even in view of

the fact that Hul l did receive national news coverage as a tax expert,
that he was a pres idential cand idate, and that he was cha irman of the
Democratic Party.

My be l ief is that the average Amer ican did not know

that he existed until he b ecame secretary of state.

For as Americans

of today are satisfied with identifying themselves with only our very

highest officials. it is the contention of this thesis that onl y a

relativel y few astute fol lowers of the American pol itical scene were

aware of Hul l.
wrote:

This writer is in agreement with James A. Farley, who

137
While holding definite and well�c onsidered views on public
q uestions, Hull never really made himself known to the American
people while in Congress because of a somewhat retiring disposi
tion and inc l ination to avoid anything that smacked of "limelight"
tactics. He never ad opted the c ourse, followed by some of his
c olleagues, of sounding off on . any current q uestion just to see
his name in print, or of issuing a statement merely because it
was sensational and not because he thought it was true. 1

1Farley, .22.· �- , I, 101 .
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